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Abstract 
This project examines the challenges for U.S. democracy promotion and its strategies in the cases of 
Jordan and Tunisia. First, the project analyzes the U.S. democracy promotion strategy, investigating 
what projects have been conducted in Jordan and Tunisia. The project argues, that U.S. democracy 
promotion is flawed on a conceptual-, priority- and strategic level, and we find that in order to 
reconceptualize the democracy promotion strategy, a stronger inclusion of the voices of the Arab 
people needs to be incorporated. Then, the project maps out the opinions of Jordanians and Tunisians 
alike, using data from the Arab Barometer. The project finds that democracy is desired, but that the 
views on the concept are highly varied. Finally, the project discusses the findings using Banai’s three 
principles for achieving democratic solidarity. By combining the voices population with the flaws in the 
democracy promotion framework, the project discusses different ways to reconceptualize democracy 
promotion, so that a democratization process happens on the basis of the people who live it, and not 
U.S. strategic interests in the region.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Democracy and democratization in the Middle East has for a long time been one of the key policies 
in U.S. foreign policy. Many different administrations have with different approaches tried to convey 
the message that a democratic and secure Middle East would bolster freedom, economic growth 
and liberty to a region prone to instability and conflict (Markakis 2012:90). Democracy Promotion  
thus has a clear, normative argument which follows the notion of the Democratic Peace Theory, 
where democracies are seen as more peaceful and secure in the international system (Banai 
2013). To achieve security and to protect U.S. interests in the region, democracy promotion has 
been an increasingly used tool, wherein economic development has been seen as the best way to 
create a changing political structure in the recipient countries (Markakis 2012:91).  
Tunisia and Jordan stand as examples of how democracy promotion has been conducted in two 
widely different contexts and with two different relations to the U.S. The regime of Jordan maintains 
its power over the Jordanian people, and Tunisia’s revolution and process towards democratization 
can hardly be ascribed to U.S policies. 
The general conception of democracy prospects in the Middle East has been affected by what Asef 
Bayat calls an Middle Eastern Exceptionalism: that some of the basic assumptions and ideas in the 
democratization processes are not applicable in the cases of Middle Eastern societies (Bayat 
2013:3). Instead, the process of democratization in the Middle East has been conducted with the 
conviction that change comes from individual elites, military forces or in more extreme cases, 
western military intervention (Bayat 2013:3). In terms of democratization in the Middle East, 
scholars have predominantly focused on other areas of the world, as the the Middle East was seen 
as an anomaly in the wave of democratization sweeping the globe after the end of the Cold War 
(Anderson 2006:189). In 2010, the Arab uprisings swept the region and showed us that rather than 
being exceptional, the Arab public actually wanted a democratic transition to occur. The uprisings 
in Tunisia has led to what seems to be a successful constitutional government, and so, the hope 
for democracy in the Middle East has been rekindled. Following these developments, there has 
been a renewed interest for scholars to investigate the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. 
Scholar have again started to ask questions in regards to democratization processes in the Middle 
East. Likewise, the U.S. administration has tried to incorporate a new strategy in reaction to the 
post Arab uprisings developments in the region; emphasizing the need to support and 
development democratic societies in the reflection of the arab public.  
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But what do the Arabs think of democracy in their own country? How do these opinions connect 
with the framework of U.S. Democracy Promotion? And can an Arab concept for democracy 
flourish within the constellation of foreign assistance? 
In this context, we seek to investigate the U.S. framework for promoting democracy in the Middle 
East. To do this we have established the following research question: 
What is the framework of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East and how does the inclusion 
of the opinions of the Arab people challenge the conceptualization of democracy promotion in the 
Middle East? 
In order to answer our research question, we are using the following work questions to analyse 
Democracy Promotion and its use: 
1. How has U.S. Democracy Promotion evolved over time?  
2. How has Democracy Promotion been conducted in the cases of Tunisia and Jordan and 
what is the conceptual understanding behind? 
3. What are the wants and needs of the Arab people in the case countries? 
4. How can we reconceptualize the approach towards Democracy Promotion in order to 
incorporate the voices of the Jordanian and Tunisian people?   
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2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this project we are investigating democracy promotion from a research model of our own design 
of our own design based on five levels of democracy promotion. This model is partly based on 
policy process - the different stages of policy formulation and implementation -  as well as different 
levels of abstraction. We use this model to pinpoint exactly which questions this projects seeks to 
investigate, and which ones it does not. 
 
Figure 1 
 
As this project seeks to reconceptualize democracy promotion, we are only focused on the three 
top levels of democracy promotion: concept, priority and strategy. To us, these three levels 
constitute the framework of U.S. democracy promotion 
The project does not seek to identify the outcome - execution and impact of U.S. democracy 
promotion in the Middle East. While one might argue that the effects and results of democracy 
6/72 
promotion are important for the evaluation of the U.S. democracy promotion, these are not the 
areas we seek to investigate. This is due to two primary reasons: 
1) The execution of democracy promotion is related to methodologies of evaluation, 
accounting of funding as well as areas of anthropology and public administration that we 
are not capable of assessing. These areas are widely discussed (Bush 2013:1), but we will 
not delve into this discussion 
2) The actual measurement of the impact of democracy promotion is a highly difficult 
undertaking. in the words of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), “an 
overwhelming, if not impossible, task” (Epstein et al. 2007:17). Because of the widely 
accepted difficulties of measuring democracy, we will not delve into this discussion. 
 
Rather, this project seeks to answer the question of how to include the Middle Eastern public in the 
framework of Democracy Promotion. The project is, then, based on two premises: 
1. The current Democracy Promotion is being executed from the U.S.’s concept of 
democratization - including its own national interests and liberal perception of democracy. 
2. The process of democratization in the Middle East should be determined by the political 
opinions and democratic perceptions of the Arab people. 
 
The aim of this project is to investigate whether the approach to democracy promotion has been 
flawed in the Middle East. To show this, we have chosen to focus on the cases of Jordan and 
Tunisia as examples of countries where democracy promotion has been conducted by the U.S. 
The cases have been chosen due to the inherent differences of context. 
Jordan is a long and close ally of the U.S. and its entrenched monarchy has for a long time been 
seen as a precursor for stability and security in the Middle East. The case of Jordan is relevant 
when discussing U.S. Democracy Promotion, since the U.S. federal budget has spent tremendous 
amounts of funding towards democratization programs, without any tangible change in 
governmental structure since the 1950’s (Yom 2009:151). Furthermore the U.S. spends billions of 
dollars in security and military aid in Jordan, funding that goes directly to the monarchy and its 
police and military (Diamond 2010:101). 
Tunisia is another important case when analyzing U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Middle East, 
although in very different context. It was in Tunisia that that the Arab Uprisings began in 2010, with 
the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor who was dissatisfied with the economic 
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situation and the oppressive police force in Tunisia (Arieff & Humud 2014:502). Following the 
incident there was uproar across the Middle East, with people standing up towards the 
government, demanding dignity and inclusion in the political processes in countries like Bahrain, 
Syria, Morocco and Egypt. Tunisia stands as the example of a country, entrenched in autocracy, 
where the people stood up against former president Ben Ali, which resulted in elections and a 
democratization processes, which has been deemed free and fair by the international community 
(Arieff & Humud 2014:502). All this was achieved without significant influence from the U.S. - and 
most of the democracy promotion programs conducted by the U.S. in Tunisia, have been 
established in the years following the Arab uprisings (Foreign Assistance: Tunisia). 
In short: we have a case country where a strong and coherent Democracy Promotion strategy has 
not resulted in any tangible change on the level of democracy, and we have a case country where 
the emergence of democratic change was instigated by the public, without pressure or the 
knowledge of neither the U.S. nor the EU (Durac & Cavatorta 2009:17). 
We will not put much focus on the internal composition of each case, as much has already been 
written about this. Rather, our cases are to stand as two examples of how the U.S. has conducted 
its democracy promotion in the region. 
 
2.1 METHODOLOGY OF PART 1: THE FRAMEWORK OF U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The purpose of the first analysis is to investigate the framework of U.S. democracy promotion. The 
analysis examines the three levels of the framework in the following order: priority, strategy and 
concept.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
The priority of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East is identified by investigating U.S. 
interests and policies with the countries and their overall foreign assistance to them, as well as the 
direct funding to democracy promotion.. 
The strategy of the U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East is identified using policies 
concerning Jordan and Tunisia, as well as the strategy of specific NGO projects in the country that 
are funded by the U.S. 
The concept of U.S. democracy promotion will be analyzed by comparing the academic literature 
on the subject of the theoretical background of U.S. democracy promotion with the findings from 
the priority- and strategy-section of the analysis. 
The method of analysis is based on a policy process analysis. It is important to note that we have 
delimited ourselves from the stages of parliamentary processes leading up to the formulation of 
policy (e.g. initiation and negotiation). The aim is to investigate the administration of democracy 
promotion from the level of foreign policy formulation and the foreign assistance funding down to 
democracy promotion policy and project implementation.  
We are investigating within the time interval from 2010 to 2014 in the case of both Jordan and 
Tunisia. Thus the analysis is mostly focused on the developments after the Arab Spring. In order to 
analyse the U.S. Democracy Promotion Framework, we are using data from the Foreign 
Assistance Dashboard (FAD). The data is comprised of all foreign assistance entries, including 
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U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State (DoS). FAD 
shows the division of budgetary categories and the allocation of funds in these different categories. 
The Federal Budget is comprised of 5 subcategories: Peace and Security, Democracy, Human 
Rights and Governance (DRG), Economic Development, Education and Social Services, 
Environment, Health and Humanitarian Assistance. 
The premise of this project is that the DRG category of funding constitutes the main column of U.S. 
democracy promotion. This is due to the fact that USAID assert that this strategy is the main 
program for instigating democratization using foreign assistance (U.S  Agency For International 
Development). When analysing the framework of US democracy promotion  in our cases of Tunisia 
and Jordan, we are analysing what defines the DRG funding and strategy, as well as which 
projects this category of funding consists of.  The DRG funding is subdivided into four 
subcategories: Rule of Law and Human Rights, Good Governance, Political competition and 
Consensus Building and Civil Society.  
 
The data available from the FAD does have its limitations, the biggest one being the seeming 
inaccuracy between planned and actual spending. The data available from Tunisia is severely 
insufficient, showing no spending whatsoever pre 2011. Furthermore, the spending-data from 
Tunisia is inconsistent and there are missing a lot of different entries on specific programs. The 
data from Jordan is much more consistent and the gap between planned and actual spending can 
be explained inside normal deviations of statistical inaccuracies. In order to take the 
inconsistencies of the data available from Tunisia into account, we are basing our analysis on 
planned spending, which gives us the data on what the U.S. state department have planned on 
spending on Democracy Promotion in our case countries of Tunisia and Jordan 
The analysis also uses information from USAID in order to investigate the agency’s own 
statements on their democracy promotion, as well as documents from Library of Congress and 
specifically the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which provides policy and legal analysis 
on major issues for members of congress as well as the associated committees. The CRS does 
not publish its reports to the public, but members of congress are allowed to distribute the reports 
by request (LLRX, 2006). The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) does however collect 
reports on national security, foreign relations and intelligence (Loyola University Chicago, 2005). 
Our analysis is based on the access to CRS on the internet, primarily using the FAS database. The 
analysis can therefore not strive to exhaust all reports, as some might be confidential or not 
collected by the FAS. 
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2.2 METHODOLOGY OF PART 2: ARAB VOICES 
In defining the opinions of the Arab people we use empirical data extracted from The Arab 
Barometer, to gain a conceptual understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Arab public. 
In order to describe the differences between the U.S. democracy promotion framework and the 
needs and vision of the Arab people, we have categorized the available data into four categories 
that we use to describe Arab opinions. These categories are Governance, The Role of Islam and 
Culture, Economy, and Arab Perceptions on Democracy Promotion. We have extracted these 
categories from our coding of the surveys and the literature on the subject. We have decided on 
these four categories based both on the fact that these are the main concerns of the public in the 
Arab countries, and the fact that the available survey materials focus on these themes. We are 
aware that many of these categories are interrelated, and cannot possibly be separated in practise 
in the same way as we have done in our framework. This categorization is merely a 
methodological convenience, which can never be emulated in the real world. For instance, issues 
of religion can and will sometimes have an influence on how governance is seen. 
We understand the category of Governance as the Arab views on how their country should be 
governed, whether through democracy or an authoritarian leader. This also includes arab views on 
what constitutes a democracy. Ultimately, all surveys conducted by The Arab Barometer have the 
theme of democracy at their core.  
When discussing Culture and Islam, we focus not on whether Islam and democracy are 
compatible, as this is a subject that is widely discussed and disputed outside our area of focus. 
Rather, we focus on the opinions of the people in regards to what they believe should be the right 
combination of governance and religion. Furthermore, this category describes some of the cultural 
issues that many Arabic countries face - which ultimately may hinder a democratic development 
from a Western perspective. 
The category of Economy is centered on the survey data regarding the importance of economic 
development and how best to achieve prosperity and growth in the countries. A great deal of the 
Arab population emphasizes economic reasoning when stating why they believe democracy is the 
best form of governance (Tessler et al 2012:92). Therefore the economic understanding of the 
Arab people is influential, since it has great importance on how the people in the region 
conceptualize and understand democracy. 
Finally we address the Arab feelings towards U.S. interference in the Middle East, using this data 
to analyze whether or not the U.S., according to the respondents, should at all interfere in the 
region. 
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In the period between 2012 and 2014, the Third Wave of the Arab Barometer Survey measured 
Arab attitudes towards democracy amongst other questions. Researchers asked randomly 
selected men and women to answer questions on issues such as form of governance, the role of 
Islam in politics and other subjects in regard to public development. The field work in Tunisia was 
carried out between the 3rd and the 25th of February 2013, and the field work in Jordan was 
carried out between the 27th of December 2012 to January 6th 2013.  
While the surveys were created and executed by the Arab Barometer, no coherent analysis of the 
most recent dataset has been available. Thus, this analysis uses our own calculations, based on 
the data available from the Arab Barometer. When applicable, we will reference former analyses 
conducted by Tessler, Robbins and Jamal, based on former waves of surveys. We will include the 
somewhat outdated analysis only on questions where there has been no significant change in the 
public opinion between the two waves of surveys. The analysis and conclusions drawn from 
Tessler et al gives the project a sound analytical insight on broader tendencies in the perception of 
democracy in the Arab world, but will update the data and the conclusions wherever the data from 
2012-2014 contradicts former studies. 
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3. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In order to understand and ultimately re-conceptualize U.S. democracy promotion, we need to 
establish the theoretical frame in which democracy promotion operates.  
First and foremost, it is important to distinguish between democracy, democratization and 
democracy promotion. 
When promoting democracy, the definition of what kind of democracy you are promoting, is 
essential to, how you promote democracy. Additionally, the reasoning behind how you get to 
democracy, is defining in respect to what kind of democracy promotion you are doing. 
Democratization is simplistically speaking the transition from a type of non-democratic society 
towards a more democratic one. The transition towards the end goal is thus determined by the 
conceptualization of democracy. 
Democracy promotion is the act of one state to instigate a process of democratization in a target 
state - using a specific concept of democracy. It is our hypothesis that the specific concept of 
democracy is the dynamic that drives U.S. democracy promotion. 
Figure 3  
 
Our graphic illustration of the current U.S. democracy promotion. The specific concept of the democracy in 
the foreign state influences the way that the democracy promotion is conducted. This steers the 
democratization and finally the end result of democracy towards this specific concept. 
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In this project we differ between theories that operate on a macro-level and micro-level. Macro-
level theories deal with actors on the level of the international community. This includes the 
democratic peace theory, which argues that democratic states are more peaceful and less prone to 
conflict (Banai 2013:413). 
On the micro-level we operate within the context of democratization theories, such as the theories 
of modernization, social forces theory and transitology. These theories try to explain how  societies 
go from non-democratic regimes to democratic nations.  
Historically, the theoretical battle of democratization has mainly played out between modernization 
theorists, social forces tradition, scholars of the transitology theory, and scholars who emphasize 
the impact of international and external factors. In the following, we will outline the main schools of 
thought within democratization theory, and then go on to explain how this project aligns with these 
theories.  
 
3.1 MODERNIZATION THEORY 
The modernization theory, first articulated by Martin Lipset (1959), argues that there is a positive 
relationship between democracy and socio-economic development, the most important factor in 
this equation being education. The theory leans on classical theory and has indeed been 
supported by several empirical cases which has tried its premises (Skaaning & Møller 2013:101).  
There have been many critics, and justifiably so. Cases such as Italy, Germany, European history, 
among other global developments, have shown that socio-economic development may not be 
everything there is to democratic development. Furthermore, countries like India, that constitute a 
low level of socio-economic development with a democratic structure, are contributing to nuances 
of this argument (Diamond 2010:97). Modernization theory has gained a revival with the neo-
modernization theory. Adam Przeworski (1995) claims that modernization helps to sustain 
democracy rather than to bring about democracy in itself, and a high standard of living is therefore 
a prerequisite to building a lasting nation in a democratic manner (Skaaning & Møller 2013:103).  
 
3.2 SOCIAL FORCES TRADITION 
The social forces tradition claims that the modernization theory is right in its analysis, but that it 
does not fully explain the development of democracy. Social classes and the secular fight for rights 
is an important aspect of democratization.  
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Rights are “historical products, outcomes of struggle” (Skaaning & Møller 2013:109) and they have, 
historically, always been the outcome of uprisings - or fears for such uprisings. Class struggle is 
therefore the driver for regime change.  
While this theory stands strong in explaining the development of secular democracy in the West, it 
lacks explanatory power in relation to the Middle East, which has had popular uprisings bring 
nothing but new authoritarian regimes in almost all Arab countries (Skaaning & Møller 2013:110).  
 
3.3 TRANSITOLOGY  
The transitology theory focuses less on structural changes and more on how democracy comes 
about in the transition process itself. Scholars of transitology have argued that no socio-economic 
prerequisites could be identified for a democratic transition to occur.  Skaaning and Møller note 
that “according to the transitology perspective, it was first and foremost the actors’ strategies in the 
transition process itself that were understood as being decisive” (Skaaning & Møller 2013:128). 
The transitology theory thus moves away from the casual understanding of democratization of the 
modernization theory. Rather, the right behavior of actors within a given context will lead to 
democracy according to transitology theory.  
O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) wrote “Transitions from authoritarian rule”, which, according to 
Skaaning & Møller, “replaced the structural and deterministic accounts with a much more 
contingency-oriented perspective focusing on agency” (Skaaning & Møller 2013:128). Thus 
transitology puts most of its eggs in the basket of agents. The significance of their decisive power 
is strongly emphasized, and the analysis of the transition process is focused on strategic choices 
and political calculations - in the short-term at least. The sustainment of democracy, however, is 
not denied an explanation in structural development, as argued by Przeworski.  
The ends of transitions are not always democratic of course. But the development of democracy 
should come via a pact with the authorities, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter 1986).  Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that the “mode of transition to a large extent 
depends on the kind of autocratic regime that is to be replaced” (Skaaning & Møller 2013:138). 
They differentiate between authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and sultanistic regimes. They 
argue that it is only authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes that leave room for pact-making, and 
that O’Donnell & Schmitter lack this insight in their theory.  
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Furthermore, a wealth of different scientists have looked into the relation between regime-type and 
endurance, transitional tendencies, and whether democratic structures and elections under an 
authoritarian regime lead to democratic societies (Skaaning & Møller 2013:139).  
 
3.4 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
While both democracy and the process of democratization are heavily contested by different 
schools of thought, democracy promotion is often a more methodologically discussed topic rather 
than a normative one, as the normative direction is often already implied (Burnell 2008). To us, 
however, the reasoning behind the act of promoting democracy is driven by norms or self-interests, 
and is at heart of the viability of the concept of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion can 
also be expressed as democracy assistance or democracy support. In this project only the term 
democracy promotion will be utilized. In theory, the entire foreign assistance of the U.S. could be 
an expression of democracy promotion. In this project however, democracy promotion is seen as a 
specific, separate part of the overall foreign assistance constellation. 
Wolff and Wurm (2011) argue in their article, Towards a theory of external democracy promotion: A 
proposal for theoretical classification, that Democracy Promotion can be categorized in 7 different 
types, depending on the goals and reason for utilizing a given democracy promotion framework in 
a country's foreign policy.  
They argue that Democracy Promotion either can be 1) rhetorical, 2) instrumental, 3) a secondary 
aim, 4) a primary aim, 5) a regulative norm, 6) a constitutive norm or 7) hegemonic project (Wolff & 
Wurm 2011:87).  
To us, U.S. democracy promotion is more than rhetoric. We see democracy promotion as, at the 
very least, an instrumental policy, seeing that real funding and implementations are actually carried 
out. Wolff and Wurm argue that: “External Democracy Promotion is one instrument among others 
that is applied to the extent that it contributes to the ‘real’ aims that guide foreign policy” (Wolff & 
Wurm 2011:87). In other words: Instrumental democracy promotion is used to achieve the primary 
interests of foreign policy.  
Another perspective on Democracy Promotion is the Primary and Secondary Aim. Here Wolff and 
Wurm argue that Democracy Promotion could be an independent goal in regards to foreign policy. 
This goal is either top priority or lesser emphasized due to other, more important strategic goals. 
(Wolff &  Wurm 2011:87). As we will see in analysis 1, it is more relevant to utilize the category of 
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secondary aim in this project, underlined by the fact that the entries for other military funding and 
economic support have larger budgets. 
While one could categorize U.S. Democracy Promotion according to Wolff and Wurm’s typology 
that is not the intention for this project. The intention is to use the notion of ‘instrumental use’ and 
‘secondary aim’ as a premise for this analysis, as many of the other categories go beyond the 
individual framework of democracy promotion and into a much broader discussion of the overall 
foreign assistance constellation. In other words: the framework of Democracy promotion exists 
within a constellation of other foreign policy goals, either as a separate aim or working to ensure 
others. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Our graphic illustration of the current U.S. democracy promotion, with other goals. While democracy 
promotion is a strategy by itself, other goals in foreign policy are also present. 
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3.5 OUR AIM 
Our understanding of democracy is not bound by the connotations of a liberal democracy, 
emphasizing free markets, competitive elections and political rights as the measuring stick for a 
democratic nation state. Nor are we satisfied with the minimalistic definition of democracy only 
emphasizing the election process itself (Skaaning & Møller 2013:31), as this has proved historically 
unreliable as an indicator of any democratic development in the region - both within authoritarian 
regimes, as in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and after the ouster of former authoritarian leader such as 
the cases of Egypt and Iraq. Nor is a rigid, western normative ideal about democratic parameters - 
putting civil and political rights before all - to suffice when discussing democracy in The Middle 
East.  
Rather, our understanding of democracy is that no version of democratic governance can be 
described as “correct”, and that this concept will ultimately depend on the context in which it is 
implemented.  
In order to analyze how democracy can be conceptualized in a Middle Eastern context, we take a 
inductive approach, trying to connect public opinions towards democratic governance with the 
framework of U.S. democracy promotion. This does not mean that we are non-normative: we do 
believe that human rights and human security should be prevalent for all. Though, we intend to 
question and criticize the normativity of liberal democracy as the only instrument towards this end. 
This moves the project away from the mainstream understanding of liberal democracy as the only 
“correct” way of governance, and this understanding is essential to the project, as the notion of 
liberal democracy has been steeped in the understanding of democracy promotion (Burnell 
2013:276). 
As it is commonly argued “contemporary models of democracy promotion are generally derived 
from an interpretation of the historical development of liberal democracy in the West” (Jahn 
2012:688). Jahn discusses this extensively; the notion that ‘liberal democracy’ has turned into a 
‘master narrative’ in which civil liberties, political rights and market economy are mixed in a mush 
of non-distinctive, theoretically blurry and sometimes easily interchangeable connotations, reflected 
through the historical development of Western societies (Jahn 2012). Rather, we believe that 
democracy should be inductively formed; giving ear to the “demos” that constitutes the potential 
democracies of the Middle East. This adheres somewhat to the bottom-up approach of the social 
forces tradition. Thus, democratization and democracy promotion must be delinked from the 
foreign state’s concept of democracy, when promoting democracy. 
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Figure 5 
 
Our hypothesis model for reconceptualizing U.S. democracy promotion. Here the democracy concept inside 
the target state is included, since it will influence the overall democratization. 
The project will discuss how a Middle Eastern people might define and influence their own concept 
of democracy, while being supported in this act by external democracy promotion. To analyze this, 
we operate on a macro- and a micro-level, drawing on the work of Hussein Banai. In his article 
Democratic solidarity: Rethinking democracy promotion in the New Middle East, Banai contests the 
classic ideas of liberal democracy as both a precursor for peace as well as for justice, and he 
therefore tries to create an alternative approach for promoting democracy.  
On the macro-level, our understanding of democracy promotion takes its starting point in Hussein 
Banai’s two principles for attaining Democratic Solidarity in Middle Eastern democracy promotion: 
Reflexivity and non-interference (Banai 2013).  
Banai speaks of non-interference, which: “(...) obliges states and non-state entities (...) to support 
the spread of democratic rights and values through acts of public expression (...)” (Banai 
2013:417). In saying this, Banai calls for actors to set normative ideas ahead of national interests. 
Furthermore states as well as non-state actors should not interfere in the developments of another 
country. Democracy promotion should be based on normative support and democratization should 
happen by itself, without meddling by outside forces. Banai argues, that interference by outside 
actors could have grave implications for a democratic development and could be damaging to the 
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legitimacy of the opposition. It is however important that the international community documents 
and supports any oppressed public, in order to strengthen the democratic discourse within the 
country itself - working as a leverage for democratic development, without directly interfering in the 
domestic development (Banai 2013:417).  
Furthermore, is his principle of reflexivity, which is the idea that all democratic development 
happens in its own unique context, and that a democratization process cannot be put into an all-
encompassing framework that will work in any country in the world. Banai argues that the U.S. in 
its democracy promotion sees democratization as a linear process from liberalization and 
elections, which will eventually lead to a liberal, democratic society. Banai argues that: “This 
understanding has formed the basis of a universal template for providing aid to political parties, 
civil–military groups, constitutional assemblies, and civil society groups for over three decades. 
Yet, given the lack of reflexivity about the varieties of democratic experience outside of the US 
example, the template is premised on a set of bureaucratic checklists that reduce the complexity 
and inconstancy of the democratic process to a kind of static scientific stratagem” (Banai 
2013:420). 
On the edge between micro- and macro level, Banai operates with the principle of inclusivity. An 
important part of rethinking democracy promotion is the inclusivity of all political, social and 
religious groups in the democratization process. He argues that if the U.S. selects a few chosen 
groups that fit some form of criteria, for instance secular groups, it has negative effects on the 
democratic legitimacy in the country. Banai argues that: “Democratic institutions and practises are 
deemed legitimate when they are responsive to the varied historical experiences, political 
circumstances, and cultural traditions of a people. Self-government thus entails a consideration of 
the views and concerns of the many, not the few“ (Banai 2013:418). 
We see Banai’s theory as a good base for discussion and hypothesis, as the theory deals with both 
the macro-level of the international community as well as the micro-level, in relation to the 
democratic development inside the country itself. Banai does not, however, give any conclusive 
proposals as to how democratization itself comes about in each specific case. The benefit of this 
theory lies in its elasticity, which we will use to our benefit, stretching the framework over our cases 
in regards to Arab views on democracy. With Banai we will investigate and discuss whether U.S. 
democracy promotion can instigate a democratization that reflects the wishes of the Arab public. In 
other words: the concept of democracy should be defined and supported by Arab voices: 
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Figure 6 
 
Our hypothesis model for reconceptualizing U.S. democracy promotion, with Arab voices as a filtering 
determinant for the framework of democracy promotion and concept of democracy 
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4. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
This section will outline the developments of U.S. foreign policy in regards to Democracy 
Promotion. It will start out with a focus on the Cold War, where we saw a small and gradual shift 
away from the U.S. backing authoritarian regimes and towards a strategy that would export 
democracy to the regions that were feared to fall under Soviet influence. After the end of the Cold 
War, the section will describe the different approach towards Democracy Promotion as a part of 
U.S. development programs in 1990’s spearheaded by the Clinton Administration. Lastly, this 
section will cover the shift in Democracy Promotion policies following the 9/11 attacks and the 
subsequent War on Terror instigated by the Bush Administration and followed by his successor, 
President Obama. 
 
4.1 COLD WAR AND COMMUNIST THREAT 
After the end of WW2, the threat of communism was the main foreign policy issue for the U.S. In 
order to contain the communist sphere of influence, certain undemocratic policies were 
implemented, citing stability and security as more important than democratization. This lead to a 
systematic support for authoritarian regimes across the international community trying to contain 
the Soviet Union and even a great deal of U.S. interventions, seeking to overthrow democratically 
elected leaders, due to their apparent communist affiliations. Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran and 
Salvador Allende in Chile are examples of a foreign policy, where democracy was neglected (and 
outright attacked) by the U.S. in order to ensure interests and stability, which was at the time, 
deemed more important (Markakis 2012:59). Whilst the strategy of supporting strong, authoritarian 
leaders who in return of military and economic aid would serve in the interests of the U.S. seemed 
to be a rational approach towards dealing with the communist threat, there were a lot of setbacks, 
where the credibility and interests of the U.S. administrations were harmed. Both the U.S. backed 
Shah in Iran and General Pinochet in Chile were eventually ousted by their own people, which 
were demanding influence and fairness from their governments. The U.S. quest for stability and 
security actually lead to the opposite in many of the countries where they focused on anti-
democratic alliances (Markakis 2012:60). 
In response to the problematic outcomes of the support for authoritarian regimes, the U.S. 
administration reworked its foreign policy, trying to incorporate democratic developments in the 
areas of interests. This shift towards democratization was, however, still used in the context of the 
Soviet Threat and was mainly focused around countries either near the U.S. (South America) as 
well as countries where the threat of Soviet influence was present, as for instance in Afghanistan 
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(Johnson 1996:92). The shift towards support for democracy instead of authoritarianism also 
meant, that the U.S. needed more overtly policy instruments when trying to engage the civil society 
and thus came the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the strategy of 
Project Democracy in 1983 (Johnson 1996:92).  
 
4.2 DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The current framework of U.S democracy promotion was established during the 1990’s, where the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began integrating the need for 
democratic development into its development programs (Snider & Faris 2011:49). This shift in the 
approach towards Democracy Promotion was instigated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
sparked a revived optimism for the development of democracy in parts of the world where 
countries had been entrenched by authoritarian regimes. Whilst earlier Democracy Promotion 
policies conducted by the NED were mainly used as a way to hinder the influence of the Soviet 
Union, the new structure in the international community created new interests for the U.S. and 
shifted the attention from Asia and South America towards Africa and the Middle East. The fall of 
the Soviet Union fostered a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and it was believed that 
this rise of democratic governments in Eastern Europe was something that could be emulated in a 
Middle Eastern context (Snider & Faris 2011:50). The renewed Democracy Promotion programs 
that should sow the seeds of democracy in the Middle East were now incorporated into the 
framework of the USAID and were focusing on 4 areas of policy: Elections and political 
participation, civil society, rule of law and governance. 
The focus on Middle Eastern Democracy Promotion was with the Clinton Administration mainly 
focused on economic relationships between the U.S. government and the Middle Eastern states. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. lost its primary foreign policy interests, that of halting the 
spread of communism, and instead the Clinton Administration created the basis for spreading 
Democracy through economic cooperation and conditionalities for U.S. aid (Markakis 2012:91). 
 
4.3 THE WAR ON TERROR – THE NEW ERA OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Following an era of economic development as a precursor for democratization, the U.S. approach 
towards Democracy Promotion change significantly in the early 2000’s as a result of a changed 
Middle Eastern policy following the 9/11 attacks. 
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After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration announced the “forward strategy for 
freedom”, which in essence argues in favor for the democratic peace theory, where freedom 
inevitable will lead to peace. This strategy argued that the development of democracy in Iraq and in 
other authoritarian regimes would lead to prosperity and peace (Banai 2013:421).  
Since the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Bush administration allocated a lot of resources 
towards democratization in the Middle East, but the “global war on terror” trumped the notion of 
democracy promotion. In the wake of the attacks, we saw and administration who with one hand 
promoted democracy in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, but at the same time increased the support to 
authoritarian regimes like in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These double standards made it clear that 
U.S. democracy promotion as such was not a coherent strategy, but rather a single policy 
undermined by a war on terror and the search for regional stability (Banai 2013:422).  
The Obama administration took a seemingly different approach towards democratization in the 
Middle East, spurred by the problems in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. In his speech from 2013 in 
Cairo, President Obama argued for a much more subtle democracy promotion, stating that the 
U.S. cannot and will not be the judge of what is the right course of action when talking about 
democracy in Middle Eastern countries (Banai 2013:423). In order to facilitate this new approach 
towards democracy promotion, a new framework in the USAID was needed – a stronger focus on 
the development of civil society and human rights in order to create this bottom-up democratization 
President Obama argued for. 
We see a tendency in the U.S. approach to democracy promotion centered on the ideas of the 
modernization theories concerning democratization. The term “market democracy” has been 
incorporated in the democracy promotion framework since the 1990’s, and since then there has 
been a notion, that in order to establish the basis for democracy in the Middle East, there needs to 
be a stable economy as well as an engaged public sphere wanting more influence over the political 
processes in the country (Markakis 2012:92). This approach towards democratization is strongly 
influenced by the modernization theory and the notion that economic reforms comes before both 
civil and political reform are still an integrated idea in the framework of democracy promotion to this 
day. 
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5. PART 1 - THE FRAMEWORK OF U.S. DEMOCRACY 
PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
The following section will analyze U.S. Democracy Promotion in the case countries of Tunisia and 
Jordan. As outlined earlier in the project, we differentiate between the concept, the prioritization 
and the strategy of democracy promotion in this analysis. The following will focus on the 
prioritization and strategy of U.S. democracy promotion in order to interpret the concept and overall 
framework of U.S. democracy promotion.  
We will do this using the following questions: 
1) What priority does democracy promotion have in U.S. relations to Jordan and Tunisia 
a) What is the purpose of the Foreign Assistance of the U.S. in Jordan and Tunisia? 
b) How has the Foreign Assistance for Jordan and Tunisia been budgeted?  
 
2) What is the strategy for U.S. democracy promotion in the Jordan and Tunisia on the funding 
and agent level? 
a) What are the strategy policies for DRG in Jordan and Tunisia?  
b) What projects are carried out in Jordan and Tunisia?  
 
3) Using our analysis as well as academic literature on the topic, what is the overall concept 
and theoretical approach of U.S. democracy promotion in Jordan and Tunisia 
 
5.1 PRIORITIZATION OF U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
5.1.1 GOALS AND INTERESTS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
The following concerns the interests and relations that the United States have in the Middle East 
and specifically the two case countries Jordan and Tunisia. This is used to understand the 
motivations for the specific design of foreign assistance. In order to investigate these goals and 
interests, we use information available from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
Most of the CRS reports do not focus on the Middle East as a whole when determining interests 
and goals for foreign policy. The most recent CRS report on the overall purpose of foreign 
assistance in the Middle East is from 2010. According to the CRS there are very specific interests 
in the Middle East that foreign assistance seeks to service:  “The United States has a number of 
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interests in the region, ranging from support for the state of Israel and Israel’s peaceful relations 
with its Arab neighbors, to the protection of vital petroleum supplies and the fight against 
international terrorism” (Sharp 2010:2).  
The reports get more detailed when we delve into the individual countries. 
 
5.1.1.1 U.S. relations and policies in Jordan: 
While there is no formal treaty of alliance between the two, Jordan has been an important ally to 
the United States since the 1950’s. According to the Congressional Research Service, the 
cooperation between the U.S. and Jordan has become even more important since the emergence 
of the Islamic State, since Jordan is an active participant in Operation Inherent Resolve; the 
military coalition against the Islamic State (Sharp 2015:2). The Department of State made the 
following press statement concerning this cooperation:  
“The United States and Jordan share a commitment to promoting regional security and stability, 
furthering Jordan's economic development, and advancing social, political, and economic reform in 
Jordan. The United States recognizes Jordan’s increased immediate needs resulting from regional 
unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight against ISIL and other extremist 
ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy 
supplies, and other unprecedented strains.” (U.S. Department of State, 2015) 
The war against IS has arguably been well supported by the Jordanians, since Jordan was directly 
involved with the immolation of the Jordanian pilot Kasasbeh by members of IS (Sharp 2015:2). 
The CRS does however note that military cooperation with Jordan might be politically limited 
because: “(...) anti-government sentiment are high, economic prospects are poor, and sympathy 
for political Islam appears to be prevalent” (Sharp 2015:2).  
Jordan also functions as an instrument for securing the interests of the United States for 
safeguarding Israel. While Jordan has previously joined other Middle Eastern countries in their fight 
against the Israel, the two countries have had a formal peace treaty since 1994. This, according to 
the CRS report, is beneficial for Jordan, since it enables closer relationship to the West as well as 
the international financial institutions on which the country is so dependent. Cooperation with Israel 
is however strained because of the two million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan and the 
continued animosity between Israel and Palestine (Sharp 2015). 
5.1.1.2 U.S. Development policies in Jordan  
The policy of USAID’s country development Cooperation Strategy in Jordan is as stated: 
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“...to improve prosperity, accountability, and equality for a stable, democratic Jordan” (U.S. Agency 
for International Development, 2012:12).  
Further, this goal is to be reached through three development objectives: 
1.  “Broad-based, inclusive economic development accelerated” 
2.     Democratic accountability strengthened 
3.     Essential services to the public improved 
And one special development objective: 
4.     Gender equality and female empowerment enhanced 
These development objectives are put in place in order to increase the long-term development and 
prosperity of Jordan. While the framework addresses democratic development, or lack thereof, the 
objectives specified in the Country Development Cooperation Strategy are mostly conducted to 
increase the state structure (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2012). 
5.1.1.3 U.S. relations and policies in Tunisia 
Tunisia has historically had stronger relations to the EU than the U.S., which, as we will see by the 
size of funding appropriations, might explain U.S.’s prioritizations in foreign assistance. This might, 
however, also be explained by the fact that Tunisia is not located in the Levant, nor is the country 
important for the gas and petroleum market. No matter the reason, Tunisia has previously not been 
highly prioritized. That is until the Arab Spring began in 2011 and Ben Ali’s regime ended (Arieff 
and Humud 2015:15). According to Arieff and Humud: “[s]tated U.S. policy priorities in Tunisia 
include encouraging democracy, advancing trade and investment ties, and working with the 
Tunisian government to counter terrorism (Arieff and Humud 2015:2). 
Mentioning “encouraging democracy” as the first priority in Tunisia is most likely not a coincidence, 
as U.S. officials have emphasized Tunisia’s democratic transition, referring to it as a model for 
other states in the Middle East and beyond. In February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry 
traveled to Tunis, where he promised “our commitment to stand with Tunisia […] to help move 
down this road to democracy” (Department of State, 2014). 
While support for Tunisia’s democracy is great, the U.S. also has different concerns and interests, 
particularly in relations to terrorist and extremist groups. This was especially emphasized when a 
U.S. Embassy and an American school in Tunis were attacked in 2012 by Ansar al Sharia, an 
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Islamic group in Tunisia. Naturally, these groups: “pose a high threat to U.S. and Western 
interests” (Arieff and Humud 2015:14) 
5.1.1.4 U.S. Development policies in Tunisia 
The USAID strategy statement in Tunisia is, unlike in Jordan, not covered by a specific Country 
Development Cooperation Strategy. This means that there is lacking a concrete framework for U.S. 
involvement in Tunisia. According to the USAID website, there are 3 programmes at work in 
Tunisia. These are: 
1. Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
2. Economic Growth and Trade 
3. Humanitarian Assistance 
(U.S. Agency for International Development Tunisia, 2015) 
In the area of DRG in Tunisia, USAID states that they are working on increasing the political 
participation of the country. According to USAID the specific efforts in Tunisia focus on:  
“encouraging broad participation in the political transition with a particular emphasis on youth and 
women engagement; providing tangible benefits of the revolution by working with local 
organizations to identify and respond to community priorities” (U.S. Agency for International 
Development Tunisia, 2015). 
 
5.1.2 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
In order to analyze how democracy promotion is prioritized in Jordan and Tunisia, it is necessary to 
investigate the constellation of overall Foreign Assistance that the countries have received. For this 
analysis we focus on the years 2010 to 2014.  
5.1.2.1 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan 
Jordan has received bilateral economic assistance since 1951 and military assistance since 1957 
(Sharp 2015:12). The accumulated U.S. economic assistance to Jordan since 1951 has 
approximately amounted to 15,83 billion USD per 2015 (Sharp 2015:12). Since the emergence of 
Islamic State, the Obama administration has in February 2015 agreed to increase the annual 
economic assistance from 660 million USD to one billion USD. 99,3 % of the planned base 
appropriations to Jordan are channeled through USAID (Foreign Assistance: Jordan). The country 
has received 55 million USD a year from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) since 2010, 
although Freedom House, a large policy institute working with democratic development, argued 
that countries like Jordan were too underdeveloped to be part of the program (Sharp 2015:12-13). 
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The MCC manages the separate Millennium Challenge Account in the Department of State. The 
MCC provides assistance to developing states, supporting democratic development. For Jordan’s 
case however, most of the support has gone towards water and sewage management (Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, 2014).  
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Jordan has received a boost in their foreign assistance via the so-
called Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): 100 million USD in 2012 and 216 million USD in 
2013. The OCO is an account that is a part of the Department of Defense budget. It has mainly 
been used for the American military, spending billions of dollars on peacekeeping operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (The White House, 2013). 
The OCO is described by the DoS as an emergency fund that: “seeks to fund temporary, 
extraordinary requirements related to the military to civilian transition in Iraq, and civilian 
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Foreign Assistance - Overseas 
Contingency Operations, 2015). 
The OCO does not figure in the DoS budget, and it’s spending in Jordan does not figure in DoD’s 
budget for OCO. It is therefore impossible to investigate exactly how the OCO funding has been 
used in terms of democracy promotion, as transactions have not been reported to USAID. The 
fund has in general been criticized for its lack of transparency and its massive budgets (CBS 
News, 2014). 
Jordan also receives a large portion of their foreign assistance in military assistance, categorized in 
the Federal Budget as “Peace and Security”. Most of the assistance is directly transferred as 
Foreign Military Funding (FMF), while a small percentage is used for International Military 
Education and Training (IMET). The U.S. also provides arms sales to Jordan. The most recent 
transaction is a 192 million USD arms sale in March 2015 (Sharp 2015:15). 
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Figure 7 
Source: Foreign Assistance: Jordan 
As figure 7 above shows, Peace and Security has constituted close to half of the planned 
appropriations since 2010. However, since 2011, big amounts of OCO funding has been diverted 
towards Economic Development, the majority of it going straight to the “Macroeconomic 
Foundation for Growth” that provides fiscal and monetary tools for stabilizing the country’s 
economy (Foreign Assistance: Jordan). 
 
5.1.2.2 U.S. Foreign Assistance in Tunisia 
Before 2011, U.S. bilateral aid to Tunisia was very limited in comparison to aid given to other Arab 
countries such as Egypt and Jordan, and mainly focused on peace and security.  
As shown in figure 8 there was a large flow of assistance to economic development in 2012, which 
peaked the bilateral assistance at 189,3 million U.S. Dollars - an increase of 164 million USD (an 
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increase of 756% compared to the year before). It is however worth noting, Economic 
Development received 121,8 mil. USD (64 %) and Peace and Security received 54,3 mil. USD 
(28,7 %), DRG only received 1,6 mil. USD (0,85 %).  
Economic Development and Peace and Security remain the two biggest entries throughout the 
period of 2010-2014. In a report on the political transition in Tunisia made by the Congressional 
Research Service, it is noted that “the United States has allocated over $610 million in aid to 
Tunisia since 2011“ (Arieff and Humud 2015:15) as part of an urgent program, that came as a 
reaction to the developments in Tunisia in 2011. These numbers are not traceable in the official 
foreign assistance budget, and we can therefore not confirm nor deny this statement.  
Figure 8 
Source:  Foreign Assistance: Tunisia 
Like Jordan, Tunisia has also received funding from OCO in 2012 and 2013, amounting to 86,7% 
($164,5 million) of the total budget in 2012 and 43,4% ($20,5 million) of the total budget in 2013.  
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5.1.3 GENERAL FINDINGS ON PRIORITIZATION 
For both the case of Jordan and Tunisia, it is clear that democratization is not the primary goal for 
the U.S. While many U.S. officials have emphasized the importance of supporting  democracy in 
Tunisia, and while the funding was increased by 164 million USD, most of the money was 
appropriated for economic development, with only 1,6 million going to DRG. This clearly shows 
that while democracy promotion has high rhetorical priority, economy and security concerns are 
emphasized to a higher extent in terms of funding. 
For the case of Jordan, the CRS documents emphasize the peace treaty with Israel and the fight 
against terrorist organization higher than democratic development. This is also apparent in the 
funding appropriations, which mostly go to economic development and peace and security.  
 
Figure 9 
 
Adjusted illustration showing U.S. increased emphasis on other goals than democracy promotion.  
Our findings support the hypothesis that while democratization is emphasized as a foreign policy 
goal for both Jordan and Tunisia in many statements, the overall interest for preserving stability in 
the region is a higher priority. However, the question remains whether democracy promotion has 
any raison d’être in a constellation of foreign assistance that is so heavily focused on the 
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preservation of the status quo, which is arguably the complete opposite of democratic 
development. 
 
5.2 THE DRG STRATEGY IN PRACTICE 
This section of the analysis concerns the strategy of U.S. democracy promotion. As we have seen 
in the previous part of the analysis, democracy promotion is not as highly prioritized as other 
foreign policy goals. This section will investigate the design of the DRG strategy, both on the level 
of policy and statement, as well as the descriptions of the actual projects implemented by the 
funded NGOs. By doing this, we become capable of assessing what concepts drive the design of 
the DRG strategy.  
5.2.1 THE DRG STRATEGY STATEMENT 
The strategy of USAID’s DRG program consists of four main objectives, which are alternately 
instrumental and normative. Initially, the strategy paper states that: ”Democracy, human rights, and 
governance are fundamental objectives in and of themselves” (U.S. Agency for International 
Development, 2013) which is exemplified in the following four objectives: 
1. The DRG is fundamental to “advance and sustain USAID’s overall development agenda” 
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013). 
The DRG is thus part of a larger development agenda. Marginalized groups such as 
minorities, women and children are vulnerable and hard to help in non-democratic states 
that usually have weak governments or very poor civil and political rights. A democratic 
structure of government is seen as beneficial in implementing and maintaining 
developmental progress in regards to the overall development, and the DRG strategy is 
thus important in respect to this developmental agenda.  
 
2. The DRG is in U.S. national interests, as democracies tend not to wage wars against other 
democracies, and are typically easier to deal with diplomatically. It is therefore in the 
national interest of the US to help other states in their transition to democracy.  
 
3. The DRG strategy establishes a direct link between human rights and development in a 
country. The USAID argue, that consistent abuse on Human Rights fuel conflicts, and that 
these abuses directly influence economic growth. 
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4. DRG reflects the values and identity of the U.S. The DRG policy objective states, that 
Human Rights and Democracy are a birthright to every person on the earth. DRG values 
are the reason the success of the U.S. and thus should be exported to other countries 
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013). 
Whilst these are the general objectives and understandings of the DRG policy, USAID also has a 
more concrete strategic framework, giving examples on how DRG should be implemented and in 
which sectors. According to USAID, the main objective of the strategy is to: “Support the 
establishment and consolidation of inclusive and accountable democracies to advance freedom, 
dignity, and development” (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013:14). In order to reach 
this main goal statement, the framework divided into 4 main development objectives (DO’s), each 
focusing on different aspects of democratization. The 4 DO’s are: 
1.  “Promote participatory, representative and inclusive political processes and government 
institutions 
2. Foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and to the law 
3. Protect and promote universally recognized human rights 
4. Improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles and practises 
across USAID’s development portfolio” 
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013).  
These main DOs stand as the recipe for USAID’s promotion of democracy and human rights in the 
host countries. The DO’s are furthermore divided into sub-objectives, describing the most specific 
strategies that the USAID is focusing on, such as to “assist civil society and government partners 
to advance civil and political rights” and to “Promote politically engaged and informed citizenries, 
active civil society organizations, organized labor, independent and open media, and 
representative political parties” (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013:18). 
All in all, the DRG strategy seems to be composed more of objectives than actual strategies on 
how to carry out the aims of the program on the ground. The “real” strategy seems to be 
dependent on the individual projects that the NGO’s apply funding for. 
According to the guidelines on the application process, agents are to provide an entire concept for 
a DRG project. At this stage, USAID can decide to establish a “cooperative agreement”, which 
entails a substantial involvement in the final design of the project strategy on the part of USAID. 
Otherwise, USAID can decide to simply supply a grant, leaving the agent to carry out the project 
strategy (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2014a:13). 
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5.2.2 DRG FUNDING IN JORDAN AND TUNISIA 
Only marginal amounts of the foreign assistance is budgeted for the category of “Democracy, 
Human Rights and Governance”. 
Figure 10
Source: Foreign Assistance: Jordan 
DRG has only received 25,7 million annually on average since 2010 in a budget averaging to 660 
million USD annually, making it a rather small budget post. Most strikingly, the annual 
appropriation for DRG has not changed significantly in light of the Arab Spring. 
Like most other budget posts in the Economic Support Fund, the assistance is implemented 
through specific NGO agents. These agents apply for funding by setting certain goals that fall into 
five categories, which are budgeted by DoS: Rule of Law and Human Rights, Good Governance, 
Political Competition and Consensus-building, Civil Society, and General (Foreign Assistance: 
Jordan). 
U.S. funding for democratic development in Tunisia has been minimal. In 2012 Tunisia received 
$189,3 million in foreign assistance from the U.S. as a response to the national uprisings, only 
1,6% went to democracy promotion. The DRG assistance thus constitutes a small part of the total 
foreign assistance given. In 2010, Tunisia received a total amount of $0,5 million in DRG support - 
a number that has increased somewhat over the following years. Still, support is modest to this 
day, with a total of DRG support of $3,5 million in 2014. This amounts to $0,35 per capita, and in 
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comparison to the $4,01 dollar per capita given to Jordan, this does not amount to much (Foreign 
Assistance: Tunisia). 
Figure 11  
Source: Foreign Assistance: Tunisia 
5.2.3 NGO PROJECTS  
The following analysis is based on the reports provided by the project agents themselves. The 
analysis does not strive to map out every program that the agent is involved in within the country, 
but rather to focus on the ones that have definitely received funding according to FAD’s accounts. 
The analysis seeks to understand the different types of projects that DRG funding is used to 
facilitate, as this represents the on-the-ground strategy that DRG consists of. The accounting does 
not provide much info other than the name of the agent and the amount of funding, as many of the 
project descriptions do not give insight to the nature of the projects (most likely because the 
accounting is meant for internal use only). Information from the agents themselves is therefore 
used to analyze what strategies are being used on the ground. 
According to the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, 15 agents have received funding in Jordan, while 
only one has received any in Tunisia. Out of the 15 agents, nine of them are affiliated with the 
broader USAID goals: USAID, Department of State, Consortium for Elections and Political Process 
Strengthening (CEPPS), International Republican Institute (IRI), International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), CHF International, FHI 360, Development Alternatives (DAI) and Office 
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of Technical Assistance. Six of them (Mercy Corps, Center for Defending the Freedom of 
Journalists (CDFJ), Freedom House, IREX, Greyscale Films and TetraTech) seem to have more 
external projects that are not as tied to the USAID Administration. Only two companies are 
categorized as non-US agents: Greyscale Films and Center for Defending the Freedom of 
Journalists (CDFJ). It should however, be noted that some of the agents might donate, contract or 
grant support to non-US companies and organizations themselves, although the extent of this is 
impossible to track. Furthermore, it is impossible to evaluate the success of these programs, as no 
reports have critically assessed any of the agents’ projects. We can therefore only use the 
information say something about the strategy and intended results of the funded projects. 
By investigating all available information on the project strategies, we have categorized them into 
four major types that also reflect key objectives in the DRG strategies: Civic Participation, Media 
Strengthening, Electoral Support and Judicial Enhancement. Three of the projects do not fall into 
either of these categories and will be described under Miscellaneous. Our exact data processing 
method can be reviewed in Appendix 1.  
Civic Participation 
The three agents implementing projects of this type are primarily focused on instigating active 
citizenship and democratic participation.  
CHF International or Global Communities (GC) is the implementer of the USAID Community 
Engagement Project (CEP). Not much information is available, and most of it is vague and 
appraising. This is however a general tendency for all the projects. 
The program focuses on instigating active citizenship among the rural communities in Jordan. The 
project states that it “(...)builds cohesion and enhances the resilience of communities to address 
evolving challenges associated with regional volatility, domestic policy reform, economic 
conditions, and demographic changes” (Global Communities).  
The CEP consist of three main components: the first is targeted at funding local NGOs and 
governments that work with civil society, the second works with community members to address 
and solve their needs and desires, while the third component tries to empower local NGOs and 
communities through capacity building (Global Communities).  
FHI’s projects JCSP and CIS have provided free education in managing and sustaining 
community-based political organizations. The project mentioned in the budget from FAD is the so-
called Jordan Civil Society Program (JCSP) that started in 2008 but was discontinued in 2013 
(FHI360). The program has been renewed into USAID Civic Initiatives Support Program, which is 
still being implemented by FHI 360. According to an FHI website, the project is focused on 
educating civil society organizations (CSOs) on how to demand political change, gender equality 
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and learning by doing (Civic Initiatives Support Program 1). The actual courses are very practical 
and concern grant applications, planning projects and managing an organization (Civic Initiatives 
Support Program 2). 
The DAI and its TTI project is the only Tunisian project mentioned in the FAD data. Amusingly, all 
entries concerning DAI are described as a request for a 10 % salary increase. For once, USAID 
and DAI has actually provided a lot of information available on the precise actions of the project. 
According to the evaluation report, the “Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI)” has, much like FHI’s 
projects in Jordan, been focused on facilitating CSO-creation and active citizenship. The project 
has especially focused on diverting political uproar away from violent activism and into democratic 
campaigning, as well as working with mobilization through social media. The project started in 
2011 and ended in 2014, and though the project seems to have been a success, there is no 
mention of restarting the initiative (U.S. Agency for International Development 2014b). 
Media Strengthening 
While not relating specifically to any of the four DRG funding categories, this type of projects has 
received much funding in Jordan. The type is characterized by projects that seek to educate and 
monitor the freedom of expression in Jordan’s journalistic media. 
Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists is a Jordan-based NGO, founded in 1998 with the 
goal of defending freedom in the Jordanian media. Most of their website is only available in Arabic, 
so it is difficult to assess all the information. According to their website, CDFJs main objective: “(...) 
to maintain and consolidate the democratic structure in Jordan and the Arab world and freedoms 
as well as respect for human rights and justice, equality and development in the light of an open 
society is built on the foundations of dialogue and non-violence” (Center for Defending Freedom of 
Journalists). The foundation supports Jordanian journalism with legal aid and research, and it 
highlights cases of unfair treatment of journalists in the region. 
According to USAID information, the foundation was supported financially to let 50 Jordanian 
journalists attend a conference in Amman called Media Defenders Forum. The conference was 
created to discuss the impact of the Arab Spring on the media in the Middle East as well as to 
discuss future challenges for the Jordanian press (Jordan Times, 2015). 
International Research and Exchanges Board, Inc. (IREX) is only mentioned in the FAD data by 
the deobligation of its project in 2014. There is no mentioning of its previous obligations. The 
project mentioned in the budget is the Jordan Media Strengthening Program (JMSP), which started 
in 2009 and ended sometime around 2011. The goal of the program was to strengthen 
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professionalism among journalists via education, as well as providing support for more community 
based journalists (International Research and Exchanges Board).  
IREX also runs the so-called Media Sustainability Index, which is also funded by USAID. The 
program provides annual analyses of the media quality in Jordan, although it seems the project 
has not been running since 2009.  
Electoral Support 
Some of the highest supported agents are those providing of electoral support type projects. 
According to the policy institute Freedom House, who measures the strength state’s liberal 
institutions, the electoral process of Jordan is the weakest of all the institutions with a score of only 
2/12 (Freedom House b). 
The electoral support projects are mainly provided by one overarching organization called 
Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS), which is USAID’s 
flagship elections program. CEPSS is an umbrella venture composed of three non-governmental 
organizations: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). According to 
FAD, only IFES is currently active in Jordan. 
CEPPS has been obligated approximately 13 million USD since 2010. All project descriptions refer 
to an increase in obligations for IFES. In 2012 IFES helped establish the so-called Independent 
Election Commission in Jordan. The purpose of the IEC is to administer and plan the election 
process independently, as well as approving candidates and monitoring voting practice and results 
(Jordan’s Independent Election Commission). IFES’ IEC is however also criticized by its 
consortium-partner International Republican Institute (IRI), who, according to FAD, has seen its 
funding being withdrawn and most likely transferred to IFES.  
Greyscale Films is a Pakistani-based film company, which received roughly 80.000 USD from 
USAID in order to “Explore the elections process & the performance of parliamentarians to 
encourage people to participate in the process” (Foreign Assistance: Jordan). According to 
Greyscale films own website, the company works with movies which encourages social dialogue 
and are making movies regarding participation in the Jordanian parliamentary elections (Greyscale 
Films). 
Judicial Enhancement  
While not a majorly funded type of projects, Judicial Enhancement is a key objective in USAID’s 
Rule of Law category (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2013). TetraTech is a company 
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that was contracted by the USAID from 2008-2013 to provide: “direct technical assistance and 
training to design and implement specific institutional changes in the judiciary and Ministry of 
Justice” (Tetra Tech DPK). This rule of law program was supported by USAID with $40.000 and 
according to TeslaTech website, the program has been successfully concluded in late 2013 (Tetra 
Tech DPK).  
Miscellaneous: Research, Financial Intelligence and Humanitarian Assistance  
According to the FAD, Freedom House has spent at least 3.3 million USD in Jordan from 2010 to 
2014 in order to facilitate its research on Jordan’s liberal institutions. Freedom House is: “an 
independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world” 
(Freedom House a). The institute is most famous for conducting annual reports throughout the 
world, mapping several factors such as electoral processes, freedom of expression and political 
pluralism in a quantitative fashion. We have not been able to locate exactly what the money has 
been spent on, but the FAD states that Freedom House has been given the money to: “Promote 
judicial sector reform in Jordan through short and long-term consultancies in the area of legal 
education with emphasis on human rights” (Foreign Assistance: Jordan). Most likely, the funding 
has been appropriated to support Freedom House’s general research in the country. 
Office of Technical Assistance received around 200.000$ from USAID to develop a Financial 
Intelligence Unit, that will survey the Jordanian economy, fighting both corruption and investigating 
financing to terrorist organizations (The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units). While the 
Intelligence Unit itself is driven by the Belgian based company Egmont Group, the implementation 
of the program was conducted by the Office of Technical Assistance, an office in the U.S. Treasury 
Department (U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
The international NGO Mercy Corps have received funding from USAID in the category of Civil 
Society for a project that should bolster the inclusion of people with disabilities in Jordan. We have 
not been able to find the specific program that received USAID funding. However, most of the 
Mercy Corps work in Jordan is centered on Syrian refugees and the inclusion of these into the 
Jordanian society (Mercy Corps). There is a high probability that the programs funded by the 
USAID was in the framework of this project, meaning that DRG-money has gone to Humanitarian 
Assistance, although USAID has another specific category for these types of programs. 
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5.2.4 GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE DRG STRATEGY: 
While the access to information concerning U.S. democracy promotion in Tunisia is severely 
limited, the analysis has been somewhat successful in mapping the projects that constitute the 
DRG strategy in Jordan.  
The analysis finds, that while Civil Society is only one of four categories, Civic Participation types 
of projects and community-level types of projects are highly emphasized in both Jordan and 
Tunisia. Some of the projects that deal with Media Strengthening and Electoral Support work on a 
community-level - although they could have been assigned on a national level just as easily. It 
would seem that the incorporation of the average Arab person is emphasized as a strategy in the 
U.S. democracy promotion framework. Still, many of the projects are also focused on the liberal 
notions of free speech, election and anti-corruption. These are especially the projects categorized 
as Media Strengthening, Electoral Support and Judicial Enhancement. This focus is natural, as 
these types align with the three categories of the DRG strategy: Rule of Law and Human Rights, 
Good Governance, Political competition and Consensus Building.  
The analysis also finds that while USAID have clear overall goals, they are mostly focused on the 
above mentioned objectives and not the specific strategies for achieving these aims. These 
strategies seem to be formulated by the NGOs, who then apply for funding to USAID. However, the 
analysis does not give insight to the specifics of these negotiations. We will leave the exact 
mechanics of the formulation of these policies to further research. Nevertheless, the analysis 
concludes that the precise strategy is complex, likely formulated by different actors, and that it 
subscribes to different modes of democratization. We will delve into this inquiry in the following 
section. 
 
5.3 THE CONCEPT BEHIND U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
To finalize the investigation of the framework of U.S. democracy promotion, we will briefly discuss 
what our findings can say of the concept behind U.S. democracy promotion.  
The foreign assistance of the U.S., and the underlying understanding of how to ‘get to’ a 
‘democracy’ can hardly be identified and categorized by one comprehensive concept, but is rather 
a patchwork of different theoretical strings. To be able to get an idea of the concepts driving U.S. 
democracy promotion today, we distinguish between the conceptual background of the U.S. 
foreign assistance in general, and the concept behind DRG itself.  
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Figure 12 
 
The DRG-strategy can both rhetorically and in practice be seen as being conceptualized in the 
social forces tradition, where the democratization is being instigated on the civil society level, 
through the work of the NGOs. But while the DRG-strategy does show promise in the inclusion of 
the civic communities, the work being done still very much mimics the ideas behind the 
modernization theory. What our analysis has concluded is, that the programs under DRG are 
mainly focused on Civic Participation, Electoral Support, Judicial Enhancement and the 
strengthening of media. The last three of these categories, while done on the community-level, still 
strengthen and “modernize” the recipient state, taking a starting point in liberal ideas of free 
election, freedom of speech and a free and independent court. Although the DRG-strategy works 
with NGOs on the community-level, the work being done is based on institution-building and what 
Banai would call “leadership workshops” such as workshops for journalists and education for 
judicial workers (Banai 2013:418). Additionally, using Banai’s principles, inclusivity is still limited, as 
no local organizations are actually provided with direct funding. In fact, only two of the funded 
DRG-projects in Jordan have been non-U.S. organizations - giving little hope for real inclusivity.  
 
Looking at the priority-level of the general foreign assistance, the DRG-policies are trumped by 
other interests. The U.S. foreign assistance in Jordan and Tunisia is driven by two main factors: 
the prioritization of “economic development” and “peace and security” above anything else. Of 
these two parameters, only one of them has any theoretical argument that leads to democracy; the 
development of democracy through an improved standard of living. There is, if this is the case, a 
clash between this argument and the fact that a minimal fraction of foreign assistance is given to 
enhance democracy in the region.  
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Firstly, the general foreign policy of the U.S. prioritizes Jordanian peace with Israel and the fight 
against terror higher than anything else. In Tunisia’s case, the funding after the Arab Spring has 
mainly gone to economic development rather than democratic initiatives. This implies that the 
foreign policy strategy of the U.S. still adheres to the ideas of economic reform emphasized by 
“market democracy”. 
The U.S. foreign policy framework then provides no basis to conclude that the U.S.’ understanding 
of democracy promotion supports Banai’s principle of reflexivity. Rather, the U.S. prioritization in 
foreign assistance to Jordan and Tunisia alike reflects an adherence to free market support. Thus, 
both the DRG -  including modernization of state-institutions and promotion of liberal values - and 
the general foreign policy - which emphasizes economic development and security - aspects of 
U.S. foreign assistance can be said to be driven by modernization theory: respectively arguing for 
democratization through incremental reform of the political and civic institutions towards “liberal” 
values, and socio-economic development (Jahn 2012:688). 
While we have been able to identify tendencies that weigh towards some of the developments in 
democracy promotion that Banai solicits, it is nonetheless abundantly clear that these principles 
are not part of the main concept driving the U.S. democracy promotion framework. 
As any democratic development must, evidently, have its point of departure in the "demos" of the 
native country, it is hard to see how a sustainment of the current U.S. strategy will lead to any form 
of democratic transition. This is why we in the next part will investigate the approach to democracy 
that can be found in the Arab public - to evidently see how these ideas can influence the U.S. 
democracy promotion in the Middle East.  
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6. PART 2 - ARAB VOICES: DEMOCRACY PERCEPTIONS IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 
 
This analysis will discuss the survey data of the Arab Barometer available from Jordan and Tunisia 
in order to investigate how the people in the respective countries view democracy. We are using 
these two, very different, case countries in order to exemplify the needs and visions regarding 
democracy and democratization in the Arab world. Tunisia is a more secular country, that has been 
experiencing a democratic transition since the Arab uprisings, whilst Jordan is a more religious and 
conservative country with a strong authoritarian regime.  
This section will analyze the differences and similarities between these two different cases and will 
try to investigate what is entailed in an Arab vision of democracy and governance, or if there is 
such a vision at all. Firstly, this analysis will map out the “voices” of the Jordanian and Tunisian 
people respectively. Here we have tried to categorize what the populations think about democracy 
in respect to the four categories: Governance, Islam and Culture, Economy, and Arab Perceptions 
on Democracy Promotion, as explained in our methodological section. Then, we will map out what 
different conclusions one could draw from these numbers.  
6.1 GOVERNANCE 
The Arab Barometer gives us an insight into the beliefs of the public of the Middle East in relation 
to democracy. These figures show the preferred version of government for both Jordan and 
Tunisia. The respondents were asked the question: “To what extent do you think these system 
would be appropriate for your country?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44/72 
Figure 13 
 
Source: Q518 for Jordan - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations 
For Jordan, nearly 70% of the respondents were positive towards a parliamentary system with 
inclusion of all political groups, whether religious, nationalists, leftist or right-wing. The second most 
positively viewed mode of government was “a system governed by Islamic law without elections or 
political parties”, with a support of around 33% of the Jordanian respondents. While there is little 
doubt that the majority of Jordanians support an open and representative democracy, a big part of 
the population in the survey view other, more authoritarian types of government as being 
appropriate for their country. It is important to note, that the questions asked in the survey was “to 
what extend do you think these system would be appropriate for your country”, and the results 
are therefore not necessarily an indicator of the preferred type of government, but instead an 
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indicator on what type of government is suitable. Therefore there is the possibility that a 
respondent will both find an open democracy and a system governed by Islamic laws as being an 
appropriate type of government. In fact, 21% of the respondents who answered that they find a 
open parliamentary system “very appropriate” also answered that they believe a parliament based 
on Islamic law to be the same (Appendix 2).  
In Tunisia, a little less than 70% of the respondents feel that an open parliamentary system with 
political competition is the most appropriate system of governance for their countries. What 
separates the Jordanian respondents from the Tunisian is the support for more authoritarian forms 
of government. While nearly a third of the Jordanian respondents deemed a religious system 
without elections as appropriate, fewer Tunisians see authoritarian regime types as appropriate for 
Tunisia.  
Figure 14 
 
Source: Q518 for Tunisia - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations. 
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What is democracy? 
In respect to democracy, our data shows that around 74% of the Jordanian population agree or 
strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of governance (Appendix 3). For 
Tunisia, the data shows that 70,1% support the same statement. 
When asked what the most important feature of a democracy is, around 43% of the Jordanians 
emphasize the political strength of democracy as their first feature. A small majority in Jordan 
(57%) stated that economic proponents were the most important aspect of democracy, these being 
either “low economic inequality”, “Eliminating financial and administrative corruption” or “basic 
necessities for all” (Appendix 4) While there has been a drop in the percentage of the population 
that sees democracy as primarily an economic beneficial system, the first and second wave of 
surveys also finds, that the general conception of democracy in the Arab world is instrumental 
(Tessler et al 2012:92). Tessler et al. find that “Such findings suggest that economic issues are 
central to the way that many Arab citizens think about governance and, accordingly, that many 
men and women probably have an instrumental conception of democracy” (Tessler et al 2008:99).  
In Tunisia, the perception of what is primary feature of democracy is very much similar to that of 
the Jordanians. In Tunisia, 44% highlight either “the opportunity to the change the government 
through elections”, “Freedom to criticize the government” or “Equality of political rights between 
citizens” as the primary feature of democracy, while the remaining 55% chose economic factors as 
being most important for democracy (Appendix 4).  
Thus we can see that the Tunisian and Jordanians are divided between what factors are most 
important in a democracy - political or economic factors -, and that a small majority in both 
countries emphasizes economic features of democracy. 
To nuance this notion, one could look at a survey conducted by Center for Strategic Studies at the 
University of Jordan, which asked Jordanian about “The State of Democracy”. Here, Jordanians 
were asked open-ended question about what they believed was constitutional for a democracy. To 
the question “What is the most important factor that must exist in order to consider a country 
democratic?” an average of 63% over the period of 1999-2008 answered that political and civil 
rights were the most important factor (Braizat 2010:132). According to the Arab Barometer, 53% of 
the Jordanians believe that “The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with 
the people’s wishes” (Appendix 5), while 20% of Jordanians believe that it would be either good or 
very good for their country to have a strong nondemocratic leader, who does not bother with 
parliament or elections (Appendix 6).  
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There are some who believe that democracy is the best political system, but still want a strong 
nondemocratic leader. How is that possible, one might ask? Tessler and Jamal suggest that 
democracy would be destabilizing or enhance danger for some groups of society (Tessler et al. 
2008:106). Stability is thus a central theme of Jordanian wishes. This is apparent in the survey-
data, which shows that around 79% of Jordanians believe that political reforms should be 
introduced gradually, although they express a sincere wish for democracy (Appendix 7). 
Are Tunisia and Jordan democratic? 
An important find in the Third Wave of the Arab Barometer, is the question concerning how the 
respondents would rate their own country in terms of democracy. Here, to our surprise, Jordanians 
rated the democratic level in Jordan much higher than anticipated, with 82,1% of the respondents 
rating the democracy level in Jordan 5 or higher (on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 as the highest 
form of democracy). 27,5% of the Jordanian respondents rated the democracy in Jordan a 5, 
stating that the level of democracy in Jordan is mediocre.  
Comparing the same question for Tunisia, the confidence in level of democracy is significantly 
lower. 63% of the Tunisian respondents score the level of democracy in Tunisia a 5 or lower, with 
7,8% believing that there is no democracy whatsoever in Tunisia. For Jordan, only 2,7% of the 
respondents felt that there was no democracy in Jordan at all (Appendix 8). This means that the 
vast majority of Jordanians actually believe, that Jordan is a democracy. In the other spectrum, the 
vast majority of Tunisians actually feel, that their country is not democratic. 
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Figure 15 
 
Source: Q511 for Jordan - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations 
6.2 THE ROLE OF ISLAM AND CULTURE  
Much has been said and written about the role of Islam in the quest for democratization of The 
Middle East. The Arab Barometer survey gives us an insight into what the people of the region 
believe the role of Islam is to be in regards to governance.  
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Figure 16 
Q605  Tunisia Jordan 
The government and parliament 
should enact laws in accordance 
with the people’s wishes. 
Strongly agree 25,4% 18,0% 
Agree 38,3% 35,3% 
Disagree 19,6% 28,0% 
Strongly 
disagree 11,3% 14,7% 
I don't know 4,7% 3,9% 
    
The government and parliament 
should enact laws in accordance 
with Islamic law. 
Strongly agree 20,7% 40,4% 
Agree 37,6% 42,8% 
Disagree 22,4% 10,4% 
Strongly 
disagree 13,2% 2,6% 
I don't know 5,1% 3,6% 
    
The government and parliament 
should enact laws in accordance 
with citizens’ wishes with regard to 
Strongly agree 35,2% 27,3% 
Agree 35,4% 39,6% 
Disagree 12,9% 22,1% 
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certain subjects and in accordance 
with Islamic law with regard to 
other subjects. 
Strongly 
disagree 8,9% 6,3% 
I don't know 6,3% 4,5% 
    
Source: Q560.5 for Tunisia and Jordan - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations 
How much is Islam to influence political affairs?  
In Jordan, 44% believe that religious leaders should have influence on government decisions, 
while 55% believe that they should not. When asked the same question, 24% of Tunisians 
answered that they believe religious leaders should have influence on government decisions, while 
67% believe that they should not. Jordanians thus seem to be more conservative in their general 
preferences towards governance. Jordanians both want more religion in their governmental system 
and show more acceptance towards authoritarian leaders. As seen in figure 13, 22,8% of 
Jordanians believe that “A political system governed by a strong authority which makes decisions 
without considering electoral results or the opinions of the opposition” is appropriate or very 
appropriate, while only 10% of the Tunisians believe the same. There is a popular belief all across 
the Middle East that Islam can be combined with democracy, and in fact should be (Tessler et al 
2012:95).  In Jordan, for instance, there were more than 85% of the respondents who believed that 
the laws in the country should draw on shari’a (Tessler et al 2012:96). However, when asked about 
the role of Islam in Middle Eastern politics, the respondents of both Tunisia and Jordan articulated 
the belief, that laws should be made in accordance with the will of the people, and not necessarily 
only in a religious context (Tessler et al 2012:96). This shows that the views of Tunisians and 
Jordanians alike when it comes to Islam and democracy are diverse and multifaceted, and that the 
understanding of what weight and role Islam is to play in regards to democracy and politics is 
complex and under constant development and revision. According to Tessler et al., secular and 
Islamic democrats in Jordan are similar when it comes to open leadership, and gender equality. Of 
the seculars who support democracy, 94% believe “it is important to have political leaders who are 
open to different political opinions”, while 92% of the Islamic democratic supporters believe the 
same. When asked if “Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages” there was 
no difference between people who supported a secular democracy and people who supported an 
Islamic democracy - on both sides 66% agreed. The only question that showed a significant 
distinction between supporters of secular and Islamic democracy was on the question of race. 
Here, there is a difference of 12%-point, 79% of secular democrats stating that they “Do not mind 
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having neighbours of a different race”, and 67% of Islamic democrats stating the same (Tessler et 
al 2008:104).  
But why do some prefer a secular democracy while others want a democracy with Islam 
incorporated? A thesis is that general discontent with the authoritarian - and often secular - 
governments “pushes” people to favor a religious and more moral based system. Another 
suggestion states conservatism as a contributing factor. Although there is a desire for democracy, 
vast changes in political structures can feel overwhelming. In this sense, religion becomes a 
grounded “known” in the realm of the new “unknown” (Tessler et al 2008:105).   
Culture, politics and civil society  
Some scholars argue that democratic institutions are not nearly enough to instigate a democratic 
development - you need a democratic political culture: high levels of interpersonal trust, political 
interest, involvement in community and civic organizations, and tolerance of others (Tessler et al 
2012:93-94). Tessler et al describe the issues in interpersonal trust by referring to the data, which 
states that no country in the Middle East had more than 50% of people agreeing in the statement: 
“Most people can be trusted” (Appendix 9). This lack of interpersonal trust could be damaging to 
the coherence needed in order to establish a democracy, since an electoral democracy is based on 
the trust to the government as well as the opposition. 
Another fundamental issue in Middle Eastern democratization is the lack of civic engagement 
across the region. Rates of civic engagement are generally low in the Middle East. Tessler et al. 
offer the possible explanation that authoritarian regimes and a strong security force have limited 
the political space for participating in these civic organizations (Tessler et al 2012:95). In regards to 
the difficulties in establishing Middle Eastern Democracy, Tessler argues: “Broadly speaking, trust 
is low, political interest is low, and involvement in political and civil society organizations is low to 
moderate. But these patterns may owe more to the political context than to deeply rooted cultural 
values that will necessarily persist in the future. Low levels of political interest probably reflect the 
limited extent of political openings in these still fairly authoritarian regimes” (Tessler et al 2012:95).  
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6.3 ECONOMY 
The economy in the Middle East is of great concern to its inhabitants, and economic inequality and 
lack of job opportunities are important factors to consider in the discussion on democracy. The 
economic situation in the Arab world is broadly speaking one of the main reasons behind the 
revolution (Foreign Policy, 2011). This economic focus of the Tunisian people is also exemplified in 
the way that the respondents in the Arab Barometer view the most important characteristics of a 
democracy. For instance, 22,3% of respondents stated that Basic items for all defines democracy, 
and 21% give credit to narrowing the gap between rich and poor when defining a democracy 
(Appendix 4). In perspective, 19% of the respondents in Tunisia stated that elections are the most 
defining characteristic of a democracy, 15,1% said that freedom to criticize the government is the 
most essential part of democracy. Thus we see that Tunisians are split between a socio-economic 
and a political understanding of what constitutes a democracy. There is, however, a majority that 
defines democracy by its economic characteristics, which implies that the call for democracy in 
Tunisia has not only been for political rights, but includes a broader understanding of what 
democracy entails.  
According to Arab Barometer data, 38% of the respondents in Tunisia stated that the economic 
situation in Tunisia was the most important factor leading to the Arab Spring (Appendix 10). This is 
surprisingly low compared to the numbers presented in the second wave of surveys, where around 
68% of Tunisians stated the economic situation in the country as the main reason for the uprising 
(Foreign Policy, 2011). 
When discussing the importance of economic considerations in Jordan, an interesting factor comes 
up in the survey data. According to the Arab Barometer, 39,4% of Jordanians believe that under a 
democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak, while an average of 31,9% in the 
Middle East agree or strongly agree with this statement (Appendix 3). The notion is, that strong 
leadership in an authoritarian regime handles the economic sector better and that this economic 
stability would be damaged by an electoral democratic state. This idea, that democracy is bad for 
the economy, clashes with the aforementioned 74% of Jordanians, who believe that democracy is 
the best form of governance (Appendix 3). 
Economic considerations are important all across the region, and the answer to why there seems 
to be a democratic deficit in the Middle East could, according to Diamond, be stemming from the 
economic structures of the Middle Eastern regimes (Diamond 2010:98).  
Many Middle Eastern countries have rentier-economies, stemming from either natural resources or 
relying on foreign aid. This is indeed true in Jordan, where the Jordanian regime is dependent on 
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economic assistance from outside countries, especially the U.S. (Diamond 2010:101). The rentier 
economies of the Middle Eastern regimes provides a structural problem in terms of democratic 
potential, since this form of economy leads to both a weak civil society as well as a weak market 
economy (Diamond 2010:98). This makes the people in these countries dependent on the regime 
for economic prosperity, and could therefore severely impact the support for democracy, since a 
change in regime structure also will lead to economic uncertainty. 
Figure 17 
 
Source: Q515.1 for Tunisia and Jordan - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations 
During the Arab uprisings, one of the main reasons behind the revolts across the region was the 
call for dignity, both in a political sense but also in an economic sense. The economic development 
of the Middle Eastern regimes is very important to the people living in the countries, and their 
wishes of personal economic opportunities were not taken seriously by their respective 
incumbents. As Diamond concludes, the Arab public has a very instrumental view on democracy, 
stating the economic possibilities of regime change as influential in the way that the arab people 
see democratic reform (Diamond 2010:98). 
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6.4 ARAB PERCEPTIONS ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
One of the most interesting conclusions found in the Arab Barometer data, is on the question 
concerning how the respondents across the Middle East feel about U.S. democracy promotion and 
how external actors influence the government in the Middle Eastern countries. Although these 
opinions might not relate specifically to the DRG framework that we have analyzed in this project, 
the connotations to U.S. intervention i regards to democratic development is interesting 
nonetheless. To our surprise, the Jordanian respondents actually view the democratization efforts 
by the U.S. more positively than we would have believed. According to the Arab Barometer, 42,7% 
of Jordanians feel, that the economic relationship between the U.S. and Jordan should increase, 
while 27% think that it should stay at the current level (Appendix 11). When asked “Do you think 
the influence of the United States on the development of democracy in your country has been...” 
26% of Jordanian answered somewhat positive, while 22,6% believed that the U.S. did not have 
any influence regarding democracy in Jordan. For Tunisia, there is a much more negative view on 
U.S. Democracy Promotion, with a total of 42% answering either somewhat negative or very 
negative to the question of U.S. influence on democracy promotion (Appendix 12). 
Despite this seeming acceptance towards U.S. Democracy Promotion programs in Jordan, there is 
however another view on what the U.S. should be doing in the Middle Eastern region. According to 
the data, only 8% of the Jordanian respondents believe, that the most positive result of U.S. 
policies in the Middle East, is to promote democracy.  8,3% of Tunisians believe the same, while 
an average of 8% throughout the Middle East have stated that the most positive policy the U.S. 
can follow is to promote democracy. 44% of all respondents across the Middle East believe that 
the US shouldn’t interfere at all in the region. In Tunisia this accounts for 54% of the respondents, 
while only 36% of Jordanian respondents believe the same (Appendix 13). Thus, there is a high 
level of opposition towards U.S. interference among the Arab public in general.  
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Figure 18 
Source: Q713 for All sample countries - Arab Barometer Third Survey 2012-2014. Own calculations 
  
6.5 GENERAL FINDINGS 
The general findings regarding Arab voices about democracy in the Arab Barometer are as follows: 
Governance: 
- Around 70% of Tunisians prefer a democratic government 
- Around 74% of Jordanians prefer a democratic government 
 
Islam and Culture: 
- 43,8% of jordanians believe that religious leaders should have influence over government 
decisions. 24,4% of Tunisians believe the same.  
- In Jordan, 83,2% of the respondents believe that laws should made in accordance with 
Islamic law. 58,3% of Tunisians believe the same.  
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Economy: 
- 38% of the Tunisians state, that the Arab Spring was instigated by economic problems 
- 31,9% of all the respondents across the Middle East believe, that economy runs badly in a 
democracy 
 
Arab Perceptions on Democracy Promotion: 
- 26% of the Jordanian respondents states, that the U.S. has had a somewhat positive 
influence on the level of democracy in Jordan 
- 44% of the respondents all across the Middle East believe, that the U.S. should not 
interfere in the region 
- 82,1% of the Jordanian respondents rated the level of democracy in Jordan a 5 or higher 
(on a scale from 0 to 10) 
- 63% of the Tunisian rated the level of democracy in Tunisia a 5 or lower 
 
One of the biggest challenges for democratization in the Middle East is not necessarily the Arab 
people themselves, but the lack of political and democratic experience. The survey data quite 
clearly shows that the people of Tunisia and Jordan, and indeed the whole Middle East, want 
democracy. Though, they are not quite clear about what form of democracy should be in place, 
what a democratic government should focus on or what the role of religion should be in this new 
form of political system. Put simply, there is not coherent idea of what democracy entails. This is 
only natural - no society entailing a plurality of people with different opinions will reach a consensus 
on how to govern their country before they have at least had some experience with political 
competition, functioning state institutions and have gained some kind of trust to the democratic 
game. The most important insight is not that the Arabs differ in views, but that they themselves 
believe in a democratic development.  
There is a significant amount of the Arab public who view democracy as an instrument towards 
some end, emphasizing the importance of economic factors such as equality and basic provision 
much higher than the political and social characteristics of a democracy. This indicates that the 
perception of democracy held by a part of the Arab public leans toward social and economic 
aspect, while another part leans more toward the political and civil right held by classic liberal 
democrats.  
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Diamond argues, that the economic structures in the Middle Eastern regimes are one of the 
biggest hindrance for democratic development, since the Arab public “(...) fail to develop the 
organic expectations of accountability that emerge when states make citizens pay taxes” (Diamond 
2010:98). While economic structures on one hand can be seen as damaging for democratic 
progress, the economic situation in the Middle Eastern regimes could also be positive for an overall 
democratization in the Middle East. The public in Jordan are dissatisfied with the economic policies 
conducted by the regime, and in Tunisia it can be said that it was the economic situation brought 
on by the Ben Ali regime that sparked the revolution (Foreign Policy, 2010).  
According to Tessler et al, the public in the Middle East lack political experience, and a lack of 
interpersonal trust and engagement in the civil society is a big hindrance in seizing democratic 
potential in these countries. The lack of experience with political reform in Jordan has influenced 
the way that the Jordanian people think about democracy. The Jordanian understanding of 
democracy breaks with the dichotomy of Shari’a vs. Democracy. It is diverse, complex and fueled 
by a history that has lacked inclusivity for seculars and religious groups alike. The same goes for 
Tunisia that has now broken the chains of autocracy. Here, like in many places in the Middle East, 
the call for change and democracy has had as much an economic foundation as a political one 
(Tessler et al 2012:96).  
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7. RECONCEPTUALISATION OF U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
In this section we will describe the challenges that the U.S. democracy promotion framework faces, 
and ultimately discuss a way to conceptually change this framework. The purpose of this 
discussion is not to design a new framework for democracy promotion, but rather to specifically 
identify the problems and challenges of the U.S. democracy promotion framework. As the project is 
built on the hypotheses that Banai’s principles constitute, we will criticize each of the U.S. 
democracy promotion framework levels using Banai’s terminology, along with other academia and 
evidence that further exemplifies the challenges and problems associated with U.S. democracy 
promotion. To do this, we have operationalized Banai’s principles of Reflexivity, Non-interference 
and Inclusivity into our democracy promotion model.  
Figure 18 
 
Operationalizing Banai’s theory    
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7.1 CONCEPTUAL CHANGES: REFLEXIVITY 
“As a matter of historical construction, democracy changes with the world it reflects upon. Different 
social contexts, as I have argued throughout, produce different yearnings and struggles for 
democracy. It follows from this that those who seek to advance the cause of democracy abroad 
must themselves be sufficiently reflective to understand the limitations and possibilities presented 
by each context” (Banai 2013:419). 
As described in our conclusion to the U.S. democracy promotion framework analysis, the concept 
of U.S. democracy promotion is arguably defined by two different theories: modernization and a 
bottom-up approach. While many of the projects might focus on open-ended civic participation, it is 
still worth remarking that the U.S. still mainly prioritizes economic reforms based on the linearity of 
the modernization theory. This implies that gradual economic liberalization and political reform will 
eventually lead to a democratic society. Meanwhile the NGOs, USAID or other actors within the 
negotiations for policy formulation might be responsible for the more open-ended, bottom-up 
approach that many of the projects exemplify. While the USAID does design Country Strategies, 
frameworks for the development of specific countries, most of them are generally focused on the 
modernization-type of development. Instead of applying a generic concept for these Country 
Strategies, they could benefit from focusing on the particular, context-sensitive democratic 
development. This (re)conceptualization would be needed to establish a reflexive promotion of 
democracy. 
Focusing on modernization is sensible from a realistic perspective, seeing as it secures economic 
and security interests, but the result is that the democracy promotion in the Middle East fails to 
include the country and people-specific context - a factor that has great impact on how 
democratization happens.  
“This [liberal] understanding has formed the basis of a universal template for providing aid to 
political parties, civil-military groups, constitutional assemblies, and civil society groups for over 
three decades” (Banai 2013:420). As Banai argues, this template “is premised on a set of 
bureaucratic checklists that reduce the complexity and inconstancy of the democratic process to a 
kind of static scientific stratagem” (Banai 2013:420).  
In saying this, Banai is not articulating an instrumental critique of U.S. democracy promotion. 
Rather, he is saying that the U.S. should stop forcing this template on the Middle East and start 
listening to the desires and needs of the Arab population. If the U.S. really wishes to see a 
democratic development, this should be the starting point of U.S. democracy promotion. In the 
concept of modernization lies a normative assumption of how democracy is to be conceived; both 
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in terms of the developmental path of the democratization process and in terms of the final goal or 
understanding of what constitutes a democracy. These two points are undeniably connected, the 
first leading to the second. The misunderstanding lies in disregarding the normativity of these 
assumptions: the liberal and secular ideas that constitute the concept of democracy promoted by 
the U.S. are not aligned with the understanding of democracy that is prevalent in the Middle East.  
 
The question is - what constitutes a democracy in the eyes of the Arab people? To conceptually 
change U.S. democracy promotion to fit with the principle of reflexivity, it is vital to recognize what 
the Jordanians and the Tunisians believe. According to our analysis of the Arab Barometer Data, 
the Jordanian view on democracy is very multifaceted, drawing on many different approaches 
towards what constitutes a democracy. According to our data, a majority of Jordanian actually 
believe that Jordan already is a democracy, with 82,1% of the respondents rating the level of 
democracy in Jordan a 5 or higher (Figure 15). In addition, even though 72% of Jordanians 
support a democratic government, there is also high support for inclusion of Islamic penal laws and 
religious leaders in politics (Figure 16). Furthermore, both the Tunisian and Jordanian population 
is split between an economic and a political perception of democracy. It is thus hard to give a clear 
answer to what democracy means in a Middle Eastern context. 
More than anything, this emphasizes the need for reflexivity: the lack of democratic experience and 
the diverse understanding of democracy calls for a dynamic and reflexive process of public 
dialogue and participation, to be able to reach something that can be called a democratic 
consensus towards democracy in the Middle East.  
 
7.2 PRIORITIES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: NON-INTERFERENCE.  
Using the theory of Banai, a part of the reconceptualization of the U.S. Democracy Promotion 
should be based on the idea, that a democratization in the Middle East should be left to its own 
devices, not meddled with, and the result ultimately not contested.  
When analyzing the foreign assistance in the cases of Jordan and Tunisia, the question of priority 
becomes clear in regards to U.S. democracy promotion. While democracy promotion constitutes 
millions of dollars in both Jordan and Tunisia, the amount of democracy promotion funds is but a 
fraction of the total amount of foreign assistance flowing into these countries. Rather, the emphasis 
- and the majority of funding - relates to security and economic affairs. While the U.S. increased its 
foreign assistance to Tunisia by 164 mil. USD (756%) in 2012, only a marginal 1,6 mil. USD 
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(0,85%) of the total foreign assistance was appropriated to DRG. It is abundantly clear that 
economic and security goals are the main priority. 
This creates a conceptual problem, as the funding to democracy promotion is working at a societal 
level while the majority of the remaining assistance goes to the very regime that a democratization 
process would try to influence or change. The problem in Jordan now, and Tunisia under the 
regime of Ben Ali is, that the U.S. tries to instigate change with one hand while at the same time 
maintaining the status quo with the other. With a skewed distribution of assistance upholding the 
autocratic regimes, the possible democratization stemming from the democracy promotion 
assistance has little chance of changing the much more organized, well-funded and protected 
regime (Burnell 2010:6). The problem thus lies within the structural building of foreign assistance 
as a whole, wherein democracy promotion only represents a small fraction of the total budget - and 
thus of the total concept.  
As mentioned, the U.S. democracy promotion strategy has focused on liberalizing market 
economies and instigating political reform. In this way, the U.S. has been able to maintain its 
bilateral diplomacy with authoritarian regimes throughout, while at the same time claiming their 
dedication to democratic development in the region. This way of applying democracy promotion 
has been beneficial for the U.S. and the Jordanian elite alike, but has not helped the Jordanian 
people. Jordan is still being characterized by Freedom House as “Not Free”, lacking in both 
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House b). Furthermore, the little progress that has been 
initiated by the Jordanian regime towards political reform is seen with skepticism by many scholars. 
As Morten Valbjørn (2010) and others have pointed out, the political development in Jordan, as 
well as other Arab regimes, that are seemingly instigating political reform are examples of 
liberalizing autocracy, giving pretend to pseudo-features of democratic development (Foreign 
Policy, 2015).The liberal autocracy of the Middle East is thus characterized by Morten Valbjørn as 
“always ap-pearing as being in the midst of a promising reform process, but still always an 
auto­cracy (...). They are only following Lampe­du­sa’s old advice that "if we want things to stay as 
they are, things will have to change." Such liberalizing autocracies should not be perceived as 
be-ing a transitory state on the road toward democracy, but rather as a distinct and quite resilient 
kind of authoritarian regime” (Foreign Policy, 2010). The idea of the resilient authoritarian regime in 
the Middle East, flexing its political structure to fit into a western idea of political reform, while still 
maintaining a tight grip on power, is echoed by scholars such as Larry Diamond (Diamond 2010), 
Sean Yom (2009) and Ashley Barnes (Barnes 2013).   
Another point that Valbjørn makes is that “Those in real power are not accountable to their citi-zens 
and they do not aim to gi­ve up or even share their power” (Foreign Policy, 2010). This is the basic 
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idea of a rentier state; that the ruling elite is not accountable to the people that they govern, which 
is also visible in a truly pure form in the case of Saudi Arabia. For the Saudi Kingdom, oil is the 
main source of income and God the main source of legitimacy to rule, making the regime both 
economically and politically de-linked from the people they govern (Kuru 2014:400). 
 
In the case of Jordan, some form of rentier state features is also evident, although not in such an 
extreme case as Saudi Arabia. Instead of oil, the Jordanian Kingdom relies on steady flows of 
foreign aid from the U.S. to keep its economy stable. “Western aid makes possible the regime’s 
key political strategy of spending massively on public jobs without imposing steep taxes. From 
2001 through 2006, the foreign assistance that Jordan raked in accounted for 27 percent of all 
domestic revenues” (Yom 2009:163). There are many more factors that contribute to the prevailing 
authoritarian state structure in the Middle East. Diamond for example speaks of the refined 
mukhabarat (the intelligence) of the regime that keeps an eye out for possible dissidents, and the 
skewed distribution of the economic wealth (Diamond 2010:99). 
Thus, it is neither viable nor believable that the Jordanian Kingdom has any interest in letting its 
citizens see any real democratic progress. As we have seen elsewhere, such as in the case of 
Tunisia, real democratization comes not from the gradual reform of government by authoritarian 
leaders, but by the demands of a vibrant civil and political society that can articulate the need for 
change and critique of the status quo. 
Tunisia is in this way a good example of how the principle of non-interference could be applied. 
According to Banai, by not interfering in the Tunisian process that was initiated in 2011, the U.S. 
has not deemed illegitimate any of the actors represented in the political sphere after the ousting of 
Ben Ali. Banai’s point is exactly that non-interference is vital if a democratic process is to be 
deemed legitimate by all parties of this process. So in this particular case, the U.S. did exactly what 
Banai has proposed: they kept away from supporting or meddling with the sphere of political 
competition following the uprisings, and only stepped in after a legitimate government was 
established by the Tunisian people themselves. The non-interfering policy was in this way 
supportive of a legitimate Tunisian government that has later happened to embrace political 
pluralism in the constitutional assembly. However, it may be too much to say that the U.S. has 
acted in accordance with Banai’s principle willingly and intentionally. Rather, it is most likely a 
coincidence that has, along with many other factors, contributed to the outcome of the current 
Tunisian process. Either way, the case of U.S. democracy promotion in Tunisia after the Arab 
Spring can give us a clue as how to deal with other countries in the Middle East, if we are to 
reconceptualize democracy promotion - both the countries that are in transition to democracy and 
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the countries that are still far from it.   
A strong indicator of the requirement of Banai’s principle of non-interference in U.S. democracy 
promotion is the major opposition in the Middle East for U.S. involvement. Especially among 
Tunisians the opposition towards American interference is strong, as 54% of Tunisians believe that 
the “US shouldn’t interfere” in the region at all. In comparison, an average of 8% believe that 
democracy promotion is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in the region (Appendix 
13). Although 26% of Jordanians felt that the involvement of the U.S. has had a somewhat positive 
impact on the level of democracy, the majority of the respondents still feel that the U.S. should 
keep its policies out of a Middle Eastern context (Appendix 12). This clearly speaks toward the 
need of the U.S. to adhere to the principle of non-interference, where U.S. democracy promotion is 
conducted (if at all) through support to NGOs and think-tanks in order to: “document, analyze, and 
disseminate information about the development and plight of democracy movements around the 
globe” (Banai 2013:417). 
While Tunisia is a prime example for how democratization can be achieved through political 
activism, Tunisia is also an example of the paradoxes that are affiliated with U.S. democracy 
promotion (as well as the EU) in the Middle East. Tunisia has for a long time been categorized as 
one of the best prospects for a democratization in the Middle East, way before the Arab uprisings 
were a reality (Durac & Cavatorta 2009:13). But the opportunity for engaging Tunisia was 
squandered by the U.S. in order to include the Ben Ali regime in the Global War on Terror (Durac & 
Cavatorta 2009:13). Even though the threat of Islamism in Tunisia was deemed near to benign in 
the wider Middle Eastern context, the U.S. engaged in cooperation with Ben Ali and secured his 
rule through economic and security cooperation in order to strengthen the coalition against 
terrorism in the region (Durac & Cavatorta 2009:17). While the U.S. saw a regional security 
reasoning behind keeping Ben Ali in power, the EU saw an economic opportunity, developing the 
Tunisian economic sector without engaging in serious discussions regarding political reform or 
democratization (Durac & Cavatorta 2009:16). To a great extent, Tunisia stands as an example of 
a potential for democracy promotion gone wrong and the transition towards democracy that started 
with the Arab uprising can hardly be ascribed to either U.S. or European democracy promotion 
(Durac & Cavatorta 2009:19).  
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7.3 STRATEGIC CHANGES: INCLUSIVITY 
As presented in the analysis of the DRG-funding above many of the DRG projects work on a 
community-based, local level. Especially some of the Civic Participation projects are based on 
facilitating active citizenship and political activism, instead of promoting certain values in projects 
(like gender equality or freedom of speech). This type of strategy is very much in line with Banai’s 
principle of inclusivity. Furthermore, from the information available to us, there has been no 
emphasis on excluding civil society organizations or people affiliated with political Islam. However, 
no emphasis in the strategy does not necessarily imply no emphasis in the execution. 
While the work done by the NGOs in Jordan ultimately does show some form of progress in 
establishing a strategy that instigates democratization on the civic level, and thus adheres to the 
principle of inclusivity, Banai would still argue that this strategy is not enough. Without tapping into 
the wants and needs of the ordinary people, and without contracting local NGOs that freely can 
define their own goals, real democratic solidarity based on the Jordanian or Tunisian concepts of 
democracy cannot be achieved. Banai argues that the ‘core strategies’ such as election 
monitoring, leadership workshops and academic exchanges has: “very little to do with the plight of 
ordinary citizens at the local level” (Banai 2013:418).  
Tunisia is a good example on how inclusivity can help create a sustainable environment for political 
participation. After the ousting of Ben Ali, the consolidation between the opposition in the country 
actually included most of the different political factions: the leftists, right-wing and especially the 
Islamists, who actually won the election in 2011 (Arieff & Humud 2014:503). While the emergence 
of an Islamist party as an electoral winner might seem like the worst case scenario in regards to 
U.S. foreign policy in the region, the Al-Nahda party was inclusive in order to form a coalition and 
get majority for government. While being elected on a religious background, the party ended up not 
incorporating many of the religious policies that it campaigned on: a win for both the West and for 
the political pluralism in Tunisia. This was done both out of fear for new uprisings and out of 
respect for the Tunisian voters, who did not want more religion, but more jobs and a better 
economy (Arieff & Humud 2014:503).  
In other cases, Islamist parties have won elections (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), but 
have afterwards been declared illegal and its members have been incarcerated by the regime. This 
fuels the legitimacy for the Islamist cause and puts a stop to democratic solidarity. Banai argues 
that only through inclusivity of all political and religious ideas can a sustainable democratization 
take place, without grievances and unspoken opinions (Banai 2013:418). This is the very 
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reasoning behind political pluralism and inclusivity: that not all voices must necessarily be 
accepted, but that they must be heard.    
Another strategic challenge in the U.S. Democracy Promotion strategy is the notion of the inclusion 
of Islam in the political life. As seen in the first analysis, much of the U.S. foreign policy interests in 
the region are centered around combating Islamism and terrorists, and while our analysis has not 
come across this, there is a tendency for policy makers to include secular organizations to a higher 
degree (Sharp 2006:6). There is a strategic discrepancy between the U.S. supporting these and 
not facilitating the massive Jordanian support for political Islam. As presented in the analysis of the 
Arab Barometer Data, the public in Jordan has a very conservative view on religion and does to a 
great extent support the inclusion of religious laws and practices in political life (Figure 16). While 
there is a well-founded fear for supplying funds to religious parties and NGOs, the U.S. must 
eventually accept that the form of secular political processes that democracy promotion supports 
does not fit well with the visions of democracy in a very religious, conservative Jordanian public.  
Tessler and Jamal underline this point with their earlier analysis of the Arab Barometer survey. By 
looking at the link between Arab support for democratic political system and support for an 
undemocratic leader, they emphasize that stability is the key worry of Arabs and Jordanians in 
general. Individuals, who believe that democracies are not good at maintaining order, are thus 
more likely to prefer a strong undemocratic leader, although they support a democratic political 
system (Tessler et al 2008:107). This sentiment is supported by Larry Diamond, who also stresses 
that there is a fear among seculars and moderate Muslims in the Arab world that radical Muslims 
will “hijack” the democratic agenda - an argument that has been widely used as an instrument to 
gain legitimacy by many Arab leaders throughout the history of the Middle East (Diamond 
2010:96). 
As we have shown throughout this project, the democracy promotion strategy of the U.S. is thus 
flawed on three levels: conceptually, priority-wise and strategic, and these three levels can be 
related to Banais three ideas of Reflexivity, non-interference and inclusivity. 
We argue, that if the U.S. really wants a democratic development in The Middle East, they are first 
to change their conceptual understanding of what drives democracy forward; then they are to re-
prioritize their funding of these states, and finally they can begin working with strengthening civil 
societies in local communities.  
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8. CONCLUSION: 
In terms of priority the project concludes that the U.S. does not prioritize its democracy promotion 
strategy in the Middle East. While there is a coherent strategy being implemented in the recipient 
countries, the amount of DRG-assistance is minimal compared to other budgetary posts in the 
constellation of foreign assistance. Democracy promotion is rhetorically a main objective in U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East, but we conclude that in reality, it is what Wollf and Wurm might 
categorize as a secondary objective, which is undermined by the interests of stability, counter-
terrorism and security in the region.  
In our analysis of the DRG framework, we have categorized the different DRG projects into four 
categories: Electoral Support, Judicial Enhancement, Media Strengthening and Civic Participation. 
We have found, that in these four categories, the NGOs are actually working at the community 
level, and the DRG-strategy can to some extend be described as taking a bottom-up approach 
towards democratization. But while this community engagement is positive, we still argue that the 
main strategic concept in U.S. democracy promotion is bound by liberal values. Much of the work 
done by the USAID-funded NGOs in Jordan and Tunisia can be categorized as institution building, 
and is focused on the enhancement and modernization of the institutions in the country. Thus, we 
see that the overarching concept of U.S. democracy promotion is based on the modernization 
theory and that the framework of DRG is missing a vital connection between the publics in Jordan 
and Tunisia, and the U.S. concept.  
Our analysis of the opinions of the Tunisian and Jordanian people has shown that there is no 
unanimous concept of what constitutes a democracy within each country. There is, however, an 
openness and willingness towards a democratic form of government.  
The Tunisians and Jordanians differ widely on how they wish to see this governance manifested. 
Half of both the Jordanian and Tunisian public see democracy in terms of economic parameters. 
Furthermore, Jordanians are more conservative in their approach, while Tunisians have reached 
some form pluralistic government that expresses the wants of the people somewhat. One thing is 
certain for both people: The U.S. should not interfere in their affairs.  
Using our findings from the two analyses, the last part of this project operationalized the three 
principles for democratic solidarity of by Hussein Banai. By using his ideas of reflexivity, non-
interference and inclusivity we argue that the current framework of U.S. democracy promotion 
faces three challenges: A conceptual challenge, a priority challenge as well as a strategic 
challenge.   
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On the conceptual level, the democracy promotion framework of the U.S. lacks reflexivity. This is 
most clearly seen by the fact, that the U.S. does not seem reflexive about the context of its 
democracy promotion. Overall strategies and project descriptions are not incorporating the voices 
of the public. This point is underlined by the prioritization of the overall foreign assistance, setting 
own interests before democracy. Thus, the lack of non-interference in Jordan undermines U.S. 
interests for democracy promotion in Jordan.  
Lastly, on the strategic level there is still a lack of inclusivity. Although there are good efforts being 
done by NGOs on the community level, much of DRG-funding is still going to Western NGOs and 
is being used within a framework of ‘modernization’. The lacking reflexivity, the undermining of the 
DRG-project by other priorities and the lacking inclusivity within the DRG, all prohibit a solidary way 
forward for U.S. democracy promotion.  
 
  
68/72 
 
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, Lisa (2006): “Searching Where The Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the 
Middle East” in: Annual Review of Political Science, vol 9, 189-214. 
Arieff, Alexis and Humud, Carla (2014): “Political Transition in Tunisia” in: “Current Politics and 
Economics of Africa”, vol. 7, issue 4, 497-521. 
Arieff, Alexis and Humud, Carla (2015): “Political Transition in Tunisia”, Congressional Research 
Service 
Barnes, Ashley (2013): “Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab Spring” in: Middle East Policy, vol. 
20 , issue 2, 55-72 
Bayat, Asef (2013): “Life as Politics - How Ordinary People Change the Middle East”, Stanford 
University Press, 2nd edition. 
Braizat, Fares (2010): “What Arabs Think” in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, issue 4, 131-138 
Burnell, Peter (2008): “From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy 
Promotion”, in: Political Studies, vol 56, issue 2, 414-434 
Burnell, Peter (2010): “Is there a new autocracy promotion?” FRIDE Working Paper no. 96 
Burnell, Peter (2013): “Promoting Democracy: A Review Article” in: Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 48, Issue 2, 265-287     
Bush, Sarah (2013): “Confront or Conform? Rethinking U.S. Democracy Assistance”, Project on 
Middle East Democracy, Policy Brief. 
Diamond, Larry (2010): “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?” in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, 
issue 1, 93-104. 
Durac, Vincent and Cavatorta, Francesco (2009): “Strengthening Authoritarian Rule Through 
Democracy Promotion? Examining the Paradox of the US and EU Security Strategies: The Case of 
Bin Ali’s Tunisia” in: Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, issue 1, 3-19. 
Epstein, Susan B., Serafino, Nina M., and Miko, Francis T. (2007): “Democracy Promotion: 
Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?”, CRS Report for Congress. 
69/72 
Jahn, Beate (2012): “Rethinking democracy promotion” in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, 
issue 4, 685-705 
Johnson, William I. (1996): “Promoting Polyarchy - Globalization, US intervention and hegemony” 
Cambridge University Press, 1. edition 
Kuru, Ahmet T. (2014): “Authoritarianism and Democracy in Muslim Countries: Rentier States and 
Regional Diffusion” in: Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, issue 3, 399-427. 
Lintz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred (1996): “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe” John Hopkins University Press 
Markakis, Dionysius (2012): “US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East - The Pursuit of 
Hegemony”, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics 
O’Donnell, Guillermo and Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986): “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule - 
Tentative Conclusions about uncertain Democracies” The John Hopkins University Press 
Sharp, Jeremy M. (2006): “U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist 
Dilemma”, Congressional Research Service  
Sharp, Jeremy M. (2015): “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations”, Congressional Research 
Service 
Skaaning, Sven-Erik and Møller, Jørgen (2013): “Democracy and Democratization in Comparative 
Perspective: Conceptions, Conjunctures, Causes, and Consequences” Routhledge, 1st edition   
Snider, Erin & Fairs, David (2011): ”The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt” in: 
Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, Issue 3 ,49-62 
Tessler, Mark and Jamal, Amaney (2008): “Attitudes in the Arab World” in: Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 19, issue 1, 97-110 
Tessler, Mark, Jamal, Amaney and Robbins, Michael (2012): “New Findings on Arabs and 
Democracy” in: Journal of Democracy, vol. 23, issue 4, 89-103 
Wolff, Jonas & Wurm, Iris (2011): “Towards a theory of external democracy promotion: A proposal 
for theoretical classification” in: Security Dialouge vol. 41, no. 1, 77-96 
Yom, Sean L. (2009): “Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 20, issue 
4, 151-166. 
70/72 
Internet sources: 
CBS News (2014): “Pentagon "slush fund" pays for ISIS airstrikes, irking some in Congress”. 
Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pentagon-slush-fund-pays-for-isis-
airstrikes-irking-some-in-congress/ 
Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists: “Who We Are” Retrieved 25.5.2015, from: 
http://cdfj.org/%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2-
%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86/ (translated from 
Arabic to English) 
FHI360: “Jordan Civil Society Program (CSP)”   
Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: http://www.fhi360.org/projects/jordan-civil-society-program-csp 
Foreign Assistance: Jordan. Retrieved 24.5.2015, from: 
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?FromRGA=true&OUID=170&FY=2015&AgencyID
=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Planned 
Foreign Assistance - Overseas Contingency Operations (2015): “Overseas Contingency 
Operations” Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OCO.aspx 
Foreign Assistance: Tunisia. Retrieved 24.5.2015, from: 
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?FromRGA=true&OUID=257&FY=2015&AgencyID=0&budTa
b=tab_Bud_Planned 
Foreign Policy (2010): “Post-democratization lessons from the Jordanian ‘success story’”. 
Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/16/post-democratization-lessons-from-
the-jordanian-success-story/ 
Foreign Policy (2011): “Tunisians voted for jobs, not Islam”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/07/tunisians-voted-for-jobs-not-islam/ 
Foreign Policy (2015): “Mission Unstoppable”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/mission-unstoppable-cia-obama-brennan-middle-east-torture-
report-drones/ 
 
71/72 
Freedom House a: “About Us”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: https://freedomhouse.org/about-us#.VV-
As2S8PGc 
Freedom House b: “Jordan”. Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2015/jordan#.VWMan08rLIW 
Global Communities: USAID Community Engagement Program. Retrieved 25.5.2015, from: 
http://www.globalcommunities.org/jordan-usaid-cep 
Greyscale Films. Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: http://www.aramram.com/subtitled 
International Research and Exchanges Board, Inc: “Jordan Media Strengthening Program 
(JMSP)”. Retrieved 25.5.2015, from: 
 https://www.irex.org/projects/jordan-media-strengthening-program-jmsp   
Jordan Times (2015): “Arab media defenders forum opens on Saturday” Retrieved: 25.52015 from: 
http://jordantimes.com/article/arab-media-defenders-forum-opens-on-saturday 
Jordan’s Independent Election Commission: “Overview of the IEC”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: 
http://www.entikhabat.jo/public/DefaultDetails.aspx?id=102&type=menudetails 
 
LLRX.com (2006): “Guide to CRS Reports on the Web”. Retrieved: 24.5.2015 from: 
http://www.llrx.com/features/crsreports.htm 
Loyola University Chicago (2005): “How do I locate copies of Congressional Research Service 
Reports?” Retrieved: 24.5.2015 from: http://www.luc.edu/law/library/faqs/crs.html  
Mercy Corps: “Jordan”. Retrieved 25.5.2015, from: http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/countries/jordan 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (2014): “Jordan Compact”. Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: 
https://www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/program/jordan-compact) 
Tetra Tech DPK: “USAID Rule of Law Program”. Retrieved 25.5.2015 form: 
http://www.tetratechdpk.com/en/component/content/article/64-jordan/121-usaid-rule-of-law-
program-.html 
The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units: “Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)”. Retrieved 
25.5.2015, from: http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/financial-intelligence-units-fius 
The White House (2013): “OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS” Retrieved 25.5.2015 
from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/overseas.pdf 
72/72 
U.S. Agency for International Development - Civic Initiatives Support Program a: “About Us”. 
Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: http://www.cisjordan.org/AboutUs.aspx 
U.S. Agency for International Development - Civic Initiatives Support Program b: “Capacity 
Building”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: http://www.cisjordan.org/CapacityBuilding.aspx 
U.S. Agency for International Development (2012): “Jordan - Country Development Cooperation 
Strategy 2013-2017” Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: 
http://www.usaid.gov.edgekey.net/sites/default/files/documents/1883/CDCSJordan.pdf 
 
U.S. Agency for International Development (2013): “USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights 
and Governance”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID%20DRG_%20final%20final%206-
24%203%20%281%29.pdf 
U.S. Agency for International Development (2014), a: “Guide to USAID’s Assistance Application 
Process and to Submitting Unsolicited Assistance Applications - A Mandatory Reference for ADS”. 
Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/30354s1.pdf 
U.S. Agency for International Development (2014), b: “Tunisia Transition Initiative (TTI) - Final 
Report”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 from: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00k16c.pdf 
U.S. Agency for International Development Tunisia (2015): “Our Work”. Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: 
http://www.usaid.gov/tunisia/our-work 
U.S. Department of State (2014): “Remarks at a Solo Press Availability”. Retrieved 25.5.2015 from: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221754.htm 
U.S Department of State (2015): “The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding on U.S. Assistance”. Retrieved: 25.5.2015 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237128.htm 
U.S. Department of the Treasury: Technical Assistance. Retrieved 25.5.2015: 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Technical-Assistance-.aspx 
